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Chapter 1: Expected Utility without the Independence and Complete-
ness Axioms
This paper establishes an intuitive foundation for modeling preferences which do not
obey either completeness or independence. From the existing literature, we know that
preferences which violate the independence axiom, as demonstrated by the famous
Allais paradox, are represented by a utility function that is not linear in the proba-
bilities, and hence individual components cannot be freely substituted for equivalent
ones. On the other hand, incomplete preferences can only be represented by a set
of utility functions, and whenever they disagree on how to rank a pair of lotteries,
the decision maker can exhibit neither preference nor indifference, and must judge
the alternatives to be incomparable. Therefore, preferences that violate both of these
axioms simultaneously must have a utility representation that exhibits both multiplic-
ity and non-linearity, reflecting an internal consensus among a set of decision criteria,
none of which admit the strong substitution property implied by the independence
axiom.
Chapter 2: Weighted Expected Utility without the Completeness Ax-
iom
This paper axiomatizes a utility representation for incomplete preferences that violate
independence and satisfy only a weaker ratio substitution property. I show that such
a representation is given by a set of weighted linear utility functions, each of which
ii
generates an indifference map consisting of a set of projectively parallel indifference
curves originating from a source point outside of the simplex of lotteries. The overall
indifference map is therefore constructed by superimposing the maps corresponding
to the individual decision criteria, with the locations of the source points determining
the decision maker’s sets of utility and weight functions. These respectively represent
a range of conflicting tastes and a set of disparate perceptions of mixture distorting
the evaluation of subjective probabilities, and incompleteness may arise from any
disagreement in either or both.
Chapter 3: Incomplete Preferences with Conflicting Tastes and Per-
ceptions
This paper considers variations of the general model where the multiplicity of decision
criteria is restricted to either the utility or weight functions alone. I find that these
cases differ fundamentally in how the level of indecision exhibited by the decision
maker varies with her point of reference, standing in contrast to standard multi-
utility models where the degree of indecision must remain constant throughout the
space of lotteries. In the multiple utility, single weight case the decision maker is
unsure only of her tastes, so that her inability to rank alternatives derives purely
from her incapacity to evaluate the component outcomes and is hence mitigated by
mixture of prospects. On the other hand, in the single utility, multiple weight case the
decision criteria disagree only on perception of risk, so that incompleteness is instead
exacerbated by mixture. This allows us to discern the composition of an individual’s
internal decision making process from patterns of observed choice or lack thereof.
Primary Reader - Edi Karni
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1. EXPECTED UTILITY WITHOUT THE INDEPENDENCE
AND COMPLETENESS AXIOMS
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this dissertation is to build a decision theoretic model of choice un-
der risk for preferences that may simultaneously violate both the completeness and
independence axioms. As respectively the first and last of the assumptions made
by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) [24] their seminal expected utility theory,
these properties play a critical role in giving the model its intuitive simplicity. In
the years since however, both have come under repeated scrutiny, as their supposed
status as fundamental tenets of rationality have been questioned on both normative
and descriptive grounds, and a dazzling variety of theories have been developed to
accommodate patterns of choice behavior that do not adhere to them.
Up to this point however, research has been split into distinct lines, focused on mod-
eling preferences without completeness while leaving the independence axiom intact,
or vice versa. Our objective is to weave these separate strands in the literature into
a single coherent framework. This opening chapter will review the development and
evolution of models of decision making in the presence of risk, as well as consider
how the ideas put forth in the literature can be combined into a unified model, and
examine the distinct challenges and difficulties that this task presents.
1
1.1.1 Relaxing Completeness
It was in fact von Neumann and Morgenstern themselves who first disputed the no-
tion that an individual presented with a pair of alternatives should always be able
to indicate a preference for at least one of them, and they postulated that relax-
ing this assumption would lead to a “many-dimensional vector concept of utility.”
Hence, from the very beginning the concepts of incomplete preferences and multi-
utility representations have been fundamentally entwined. Indeed, perhaps the basic
flaw inherent to the completeness axiom is the conflation of the colloquial meaning of
indifference with its formal definition in a decision theoretic context, which imparts
an additional notion of equivalence that has proven somewhat troublesome to disen-
tangle. For example, many people would likely describe themselves as “indifferent”
between Coke and Pepsi, in the sense that they would give little consideration to
which of the two they would prefer to drink if given a choice. However, few would
adhere to this attitude in the stronger sense implied by expected utility, in which any
slight alteration to the ingredients would decisively tip the scales in favor of one or the
other. Hence, the relevant attitude of decision makers here might be more accurately
termed as indecisiveness or incomparability, notions which lie outside the scope of
standard expected utility theory, by virtue of its reliance on the completeness axiom.
The general concept of incomplete preferences encompasses a wide variety of phenom-
ena. As in the example of Luce (1956) [19] regarding a decision maker’s indifference
towards the addition a single granule of sugar to a cup of coffee, indecision may arise
if the distinction between her alternatives is too insignificant to attract her notice,
even though she may express strict preference when this disparity is magnified to a
sufficient degree. On the other hand, it is equally plausible that when two prospects
differ so much that any comparison between them would be absurd, such as in a
choice between a pet snake and a lifetime supply of mechanical pencil lead, the de-
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cision maker must be indecisive by rule as whatever she chooses would not reveal
useful information about her underlying preferences anyway. Furthermore, she may
simply lack sufficient information or understanding about the alternatives themselves.
In each of these instances, indecision does not necessarily cripple the agent to such
a degree that she becomes completely unable to choose if forced to do so, but the
observed patterns of decisions in such instances will likely be fickle or inconsistent,
and reveal little about her underlying tastes.
As Aumann (1962) [2] astutely observes, the real numbers are completely ordered and
hence no single real-valued utility function can adequately represent a partially or-
dered preference relation. He shows however that there exist multiple utility functions
compatible with the preference ordering, in the sense that if one lottery is strictly
preferred to another then it must be assigned a higher value. The converse does not
hold for any such utility however, as preferences would be complete if it did, so that
none of these functions alone represents the preference relation and hence they are
not unique in the sense of being positive affine transformations of one another. There-
fore, an individual with partially ordered preferences may be interpreted as having
several decision criteria representing a set of objective functions, and expresses strict
preference if and only if each of these agrees on a ranking of two alternatives. Any
disagreement between conflicting criteria will manifest as incomparability, distinct
from indifference which would instead require each utility to value both alternatives
equally. As the latter is exceedingly unlikely unless all of the utilities are identical, this
gives some indication that indecisive behavior overwhelmingly reflects incompleteness
rather than equivalence. Given this characterization of incomplete preferences as the
product of an internal “committee,” we can easily conceive of such a relation describ-
ing a multi-person preference as in Baucells and Shapley (1998) [3]. In their model,
an incomplete relation is taken as the joint preference of a coalition of agents, each
of whose individual preferences may in turn be incomplete.
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All social choice problems can therefore also be understood within the general con-
text of incomplete preferences. Any mechanism chosen to resolve conflicts among
the decision criteria, whether internal or external, must yield patterns of observed
choices which do not always obey the same axioms that decisive actions conducted
by the same agent or coalition must follow. Bewley (1986) [4] proposed an inertia
assumption, where a decision maker switches her behavior only when presented with
an alternative that strictly dominates her existing program. For example, consider
the problem of participation in an organ donor program, in which it is commonly
observed that regardless of whether an opt-in or opt-out program is employed, people
tend to stick with their initial assignment even though switching is relatively costless.
However tempting it may seem at this point to simply dismiss any and all seemingly
irrational behavior as merely the result of haphazard resolution of incompleteness,
we must still account for the fact that preferences cannot simply be empty and that
decisive behavior not only exists but may itself fail to adhere to the other treasured
assumptions of expected utility.
1.1.2 Relaxing Independence
As suggested by Dubra and Ok (2002) [11], agents may attempt to expand their
set of comparable pairs by devising a procedure that applies certain principles of
rationality, centrally the independence axiom. As its name suggests, this assumption
implies that decision makers should not treat parts of a whole which do not interact
as if they do, so that an ordering of two alternatives is not reversed if both are mixed
in equal proportion with a third. Under completeness, it ensures that the utility can
be expressed as the expectation of the value obtained from the outcome of a lottery
and hence will be linear in the probabilities, and if completeness is relaxed, it allows
any function within the set of compatible utilities to be decomposed in the same
manner. Thus the independence axiom plays a critical role not only in imposing
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structure on choice behavior, but also in generating it from a relatively sparse set
of initial rankings by taking advantage of the substitution property it provides. For
example, an individual who knows that she prefers a cup of coffee to a cup of tea may
use the independence axiom to deduce that she prefers any lottery that gives coffee
with some positive probability to an otherwise identical lottery that instead gives tea
with the same probability.
Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) [10] and Galaabaatar and Karni (2012) [13] devise
multiple expected utility models where incomplete preferences that obey indepen-
dence are represented by a set of linear utility functions. Furthermore, that the set of
utilities is unique up to the closure of the convex cone they generate, mirroring the re-
sult in expected utility of uniqueness up to a positive affine transformation. However,
as these conclusions depend on the independence axiom, they remain susceptible to
the same pitfalls as any model relying on the principle of linearity in probability, most


























(b) A2 ≺ B2
Fig. 1.1: Allais Paradox - Common Consequence Effect
Figure 1.1 demonstrates the “common consequence effect” of the Allais paradox, with
each tree representing a gamble that gives each of the prizes of $0, $1 million, or $5
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million with the indicated probability, and a decision maker facing, for i = 1, 2 a choice
between Ai and Bi. In the first instance, Allais postulated that people typically prefer
the certain outcome, judging a marginal gain in expected payoff to not be worth the
risk of getting nothing, and set A1 ≻ B1. On the other hand, in the second instance
they would likely perceive the chance of receiving a positive payoff to be low in any




































(c) 0.11A0 + 0.89($0) ≺ 0.11B0 + 0.89($0)
Fig. 1.2: Common Consequence Effect Expressed with Compound Lotteries
However, these preferences are inconsistent with the independence axiom as they fail
to separate out the titular common consequence between each Ai and Bi that gives
with probability 0.89 a payoff of $1 million for i = 1 and $0 for i = 2, which becomes
clear if they are expressed as compound lotteries as in Figure 1.2. The separability
imparted by the independence axiom would prescribe that the decision maker rank
these pairs only according to their differences, reflected in a choice between A0 and
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B0, so that she judges Ai to be either better or worse than Bi for both i = 1, 2, and
cannot reverse her preference if the consequence in the lower branch of the first chance
node is changed. This shows that decision makers do not exhibit the same degree
of risk aversion in every circumstance and hence are unable to separate lotteries into





































(c) 0.05C1 + 0.95($0) ≺ 0.05D1 + 0.95($0)
Fig. 1.3: Allais Paradox - Common Ratio Effect
Figure 1.3 demonstrates the related “common ratio effect,” where individuals are
commonly observed following the same logic as in the previous example, setting C1 ≻
D1 and C2 ≺ D2. Once again, expressing C2 and D2 as compound lotteries reveals
that the choice in the second scenario should be consistent with that of the first
since the ratios between the chances of winning non-zero prizes in Ci and Di are
identical for i = 1, 2. Experimental evidence from MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979)
[21] and Kahneman and Tversky (1979) [16] confirms that both of these paradoxes
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hold under a range of values for the various payoffs and probabilities. This indicates
that independence is systematically violated in practice and furthermore that these
violations are the product of decisive action, and not simply incoherent choices made
between fundamentally incomparable pairs.
The problem of resolving this paradox depends on the interpretation of what exactly
it is supposed to represent. In the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
[16], violations of independence arise because decision makers are unable to perceive
objective probabilities properly, and instead have a distorted perception of risk given
by a decision weight function. In the common ratio Allais paradox for example, the
preference for C1 over D1 may be understood as representing the agent’s true degree
of risk aversion based on her valuation of the prizes themselves, whereas that of D2
over C2 merely indicates an inability to see any difference between probabilities of
0.05 and 0.04. When evaluating these prospects, the decision maker only perceives
that both offer only a “small” chance of winning, and naturally the one that offers a
higher potential payoff is better, even though the independence axiom would prescribe
otherwise. This reflects a decision weight function w(·) that is distorted near both
extremes, so that anything within the neighborhood of either certainty or impossibility
is perceived nearly identically. However, since the decision weights are applied without
regard to the overall probability distribution that defines the prospect, the possibility
of over-weighting multiple low probability events can lead to violations of first-order
stochastic dominance. For example, if w(0.06) + w(0.04) > w(0.1), then a prospect
that pays $100 with probability 0.1 would be ranked strictly worse than one that
paid $99 with probability 0.06 and $98 with probability 0.04 even though the former
strictly dominates the latter. The effect of such a distortion is more properly captured
by applying it only to the perception of extreme events, such as in the cumulative
prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1992) [17] which incorporates the rank-
dependent cumulative weight function devised in the anticipated utility theory of
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Quiggin (1982) [23].
However, any notion of a rank-dependent utility necessarily depends on the ability
to actually rank each of the outcomes, which makes adapting such models to account
for potentially incomplete preferences a difficult proposition. We instead consider a
class of models that replace the independence axiom with the weaker betweenness
property, with an eye towards applying it to pairs of incomparable alternatives in
addition. That is to say, if the decision maker is unable to rank two lotteries, then
she must also find any pair of mixtures of these lotteries to be incomparable as well.
Fishburn (1983) [12] showed that under completeness, replacing independence with
betweenness yields a representation by a continuous and increasing utility function
that is not necessarily linear, and Dekel (1986) [8] further shows that this utility is
given by the solution to an implicit function. Chew and MacCrimmon (1979) [7]
further impose a weakened form of substitution property implied by independence
and obtain a utility that is a weighted expected value, with the weight function
being applied to the outcomes, rather than to the probabilities as in prospect theory.
This weight function can thus be taken as the degree of importance attached to each
prize, which is determined separately both from the value that it would be assigned
under certainty and the likelihood of receiving it, and represents a transformation of
the space of the lotteries that skews the perception of risk toward the more heavily
weighted prizes.
For example, a decision maker may be indifferent between a smartphone and $300
in cash but assign greater weight to the former, thus being more willing to enter a
raffle that offers the phone over an otherwise identical one that gives a cash prize
with equal probability, regardless of whether this probability is high or low. This
would explain why tangible prizes are typically used rather than cash as incentives
to enter contests or sign up for services. Since the value assigned to either prize
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must be identical since they are deemed equivalent in the absence of risk, and the
probabilities of winning are also equal, this divergence from expected utility can be
explained only by introducing a third component in the form of a weight function
applied to the outcomes themselves. If the extreme outcomes weighted more heavily
than middling ones, then the decision maker’s indifference curves over the simplex of
lotteries obey the “fanning out” property of Machina (1982) [22], exhibiting increasing
risk aversion as prospects improve in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. In
the context of the Allais paradox, both the common consequence and common ratio
paradoxes demonstrate this effect as the second pair of alternatives in each example
are strictly worse than their counterparts in the first pair, and the experimental
results demonstrate that subjects are accordingly more willing to take on risk in these
situations. This reflects decision makers evaluating lotteries by a weighted expected
value that assigns greater importance to the extreme payoffs of $5 million and $0
























(b) 0.05C1 + 0.95($5m)(≻ / ≺)0.05D1 + 0.95($5m)
Fig. 1.4: “Reverse” Allais Paradox
It is somewhat less clear, however, whether this same conclusion holds when intro-
ducing risk makes both lotteries strictly better rather than worse, such as in Figure
10
1.4 where C1 and D1 are now instead mixed with the best possible prize. Weighted
utility theory would prescribe that if C1 ≻ D1 and C2 ≺ D2, then we must necessarily
have C3 ≻ D3, as risk aversion must increase monotonically in terms of stochastic
dominance. Gul (1991) [14] proposes an alternative theory of disappointment aver-
sion that produces C3 ≺ D3 instead, under the intuition that although there is a
greater chance of receiving the worst possible prize in D3, the overall probability of
receiving a worse than expected outcome is higher in C3. In this model, the simplex of
lotteries is divided in two by the indifference curve intersecting the median outcome
itself, so that indifference curves fan out in the lower half of the simplex of lotteries
while symmetrically fanning in on the upper half. Chew (1989) [6] provides a general
model that admits both possibilities, by weakening the substitution axiom further to
allow asymmetry in this effect, so that the change in risk attitude depends on the
particular outcome being mixed in, and may vary independently on the upper and
lower halves.
1.1.3 Relaxing Both Axioms
We now consider the problem of introducing incompleteness into the class of betweenness-
conforming preferences. Note that in the multi-utility models of Dubra, Maccheroni,
and Ok (2004) [10] and Galaabaatar and Karni (2012) [13], the set of utility functions
represent a range of potentially conflicting tastes that remain invariant throughout
the space of lotteries, a direct consequence of the independence axiom. Furthermore,
the degree of incompleteness, reflected in the level of disagreement among the utilities,
is also fixed throughout, implying that the decision maker is equally indecisive every-
where. Naturally therefore, weakening both independence and completeness should
combine the conclusions of both multi-utility and non-expected utility, yielding a set
of non-linear utilities, which exhibit differing degrees of variation in tastes throughout
the space of lotteries which consequently allows the level of indecision to vary as the
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criteria fall in and out of agreement with one another. Moreover, incompleteness may
be generated within such a setting even in the absence of conflict in tastes. Yaari
(1987) [25] developed a dual theory where utility was linear in payoff but not probabil-
ity, so that risk aversion is generated not by attitude toward wealth but by perception,
represented by a transformation function distorting the evaluation of objective proba-
bilities much like the weight function in the model of Chew and MacCrimmon (1979)
[7]. Maccheroni (2004) [20] showed that under incompleteness, this model admits a
set of such distortion functions representing a range of such perceptions, so that just
as under multi-utility, disagreement generates incomparability.
The objective of this dissertation is to devise a model of choice where preferences
satisfy neither completeness nor independence, and are represented by a set utilities,
each of which is linear in neither payments nor probabilities, representing multiple
decision criteria that may reflect a range of either tastes, perceptions, or both, and
whose level of disagreement may either grow or shrink in response to the introduction
of risk. Such a model will incorporate all of the conclusions of various multi-utility
and non-expected utility models within a single generalized framework, and admit
a broad class of behavior under its umbrella. In this chapter, we investigate the
various models described above, with a particular focus on how models that relax the
completeness axiom rely on the independence axiom to obtain their representations,
and vice versa. We consider how the conclusions obtained in both strands might fit
within a single setting, and what assumptions are necessary and sufficient to generate
the desired multiple weighted expected utility representation.
1.2 Setup
Let C denote a convex subset of a finite-dimensional linear space L, so that it is a
mixture set in the sense of Herstein and Milnor (1953) [15]. For reasons that will
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become clear shortly, we follow the example of Galaabaatar and Karni (2012) and
take a strict preference relation ≻⊆ C × C as the primitive. Assume that C is ≻-
bounded, so that there exist maximal and minimal elements p and p respectively,
such that p ≻ p ≻ p for every p ∈ C \ {p, p}. For the sake of brevity, for α ∈ [0, 1]
denote the proportional mixture of the best and worst elements by ζα ≡ αp+(1−α)p.
For example, we may consider the space of mixtures as a set of lotteries over some
finite prize space X . Let C = ∆(X), the space of all probability measures over X ,
so that every p ∈ ∆(X) is a lottery that gives each outcome x ∈ X with probability
p(x), with
∑
x∈X p(x) = 1. For x ∈ X denote by δx the degenerate lottery for
which δx(x) = 1 and δx(y) = 0 for y 6= x, and for p, q ∈ ∆(X) and α ∈ [0, 1],
denote by αp+ (1− α)q ∈ ∆(X) the mixture lottery for which (αp+ (1− α)q)(x) =
αp(x) + (1− α)q(x) for every x ∈ X . The assumptions we introduce will ensure that
the best and worst lotteries in this case will always be degenerate, so that there are
x, x ∈ X such that p = δx and p = δx.
1.2.1 Expected Utility
Begin by enumerating the standard axioms of expected utility.
Axiom 1* (Weak Order) For every p, q ∈ C, if p ≻ q then ¬(p ≺ q) and for every
p, q, r ∈ C, if ¬(p ≻ q) and ¬(q ≻ r) then ¬(p ≻ r).
Axiom 2* (Archimedean) For every p, q, r ∈ C if p ≻ r and q ≺ r then there are
α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that αp+ (1− α)q ≻ r and βp+ (1− β)q ≺ r.
Axiom 3* (Independence) For every p, q, r ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1), p ≻ q if and only
if αp+ (1− α)r ≻ αq + (1− α)r.
It is negative transitivity property in Axiom 1* to which we will refer as the com-
pleteness axiom, as it allows us to define a complete and transitive weak preference
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relation  as the negation of ≺. In the standard formulation, this relation is taken
as the primitive with ≻ defined as its asymmetric part and an equivalence relation ≃
as its symmetric part.
Definition (Weak Preference - EU) For every p, q ∈ C, p  q if and only if
¬(p ≺ q).
Definition (Indifference - EU) For every p, q ∈ C, p ≃ q if and only if p  q and
p  q.
The structure of preferences under expected utility and all subsequent models is best
understood by constructing one of the triangle diagrams popularized by Machina
(1982) [22]. For every p ∈ C \{p, p}, let L(p) denote the plane spanned by the vectors
p−p and p−p. Thus every L(p) is the space of all mixtures that may be expressed as
linear combinations of the three elements p, p and p, so that for every q ∈ L(p) there
are λ, θ ∈ R such that q = λp+(1−λ)[θp+(1−θ)p] = λp+(1−λ)ζθ, and L(q) = L(p).
In the case where C = ∆(X) is the space of lotteries over three degenerate outcomes
X = {x1, x2, x3} that are numbered in order of preference δx3 ≻ δx2 ≻ δx1 , then we
may depict the space of all lotteries over these outcomes in a triangle diagram by
setting p = δx2 , p = δx3 , and p = δx1 .
Figure 1.5 depicts the structure of preferences under the standard expected utility
axioms, with each point in the triangle representing a unique mixture of the three
elements. Under Axioms 1*-3*, the preference relation ≻ obeys the properties of
mixture monotonicity and unique solvability.
Property (Mixture Monotonicity) For every p, q ∈ C and α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that
α, β, p ≻ q if and only if αp+ (1− α)q ≻ βp+ (1− β)q.
Property (Unique Solvability) For every p, q, r ∈ C such that p ≻ r ≻ q, there is








Fig. 1.5: Expected Utility
Hence for every p there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that p ≃ βp + (1 − β)ζα ≃ ζα for every
β, so that drawing the line connecting each p to its equivalent ζα shows that the
diagram is composed of a set of linear indifference curves. Preference increasing in
the upward direction defined by the vector p − p, with steeper lines representing
greater risk aversion as the decision maker requires a higher probability of obtaining
the best outcome before she is willing to gamble. The independence axiom further
implies that all of the indifference curves must be parallel lines, and hence the risk
attitude must remain constant throughout.
A ranking of the elements in C may thus be obtained by finding for each lottery the
equivalent mixture ζα of the best and worst elements. The utility function U : C 7→ R
is defined by setting p ≃ ζU(p) for every p ∈ C, so that p ≻ q if and only if U(p) > U(q).
The independence axiom provides two important properties here that allow us to
generate the representation from relatively sparse set of comparisons. Firstly, note
that U(p) defines U(·) over the entirety of L(p) since for every q = λp+ (1 − λ)ζθ ∈
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L(p) we have by a single application of independence that p ≃ ζU(p) if and only if
λp+(1−λ)ζθ ≃ λζU(p)+(1−λ)ζθ = ζλU(p)+(1−λ)θ and hence U(q) = λU(p)+(1−λ)θ.
Note that by picking λ, θ /∈ [0, 1], we see that this utility function is defined not just
in the simplex defined by {p, p, p} but any lottery lying on the same plane. This
ensures that we can define the representation over L(p) simply by defining a utility
value for p itself, or equivalently doing the same for any other single mixture lying on
L(p). Note that defining the utility in this manner must set U(p) = 1 and U(p) = 0,
and thus is unique up to a positive linear transformation Ũ(p) = aU(p) + b for a > 0,












Fig. 1.6: Expected Utility in Three Dimensions
Secondly, for p1, p2 ∈ C such that p2 /∈ L(p1), for π ∈ [0, 1] we have by two applications
of independence that πp1 + (1 − π)p2 ≃ πζU(p1) + (1 − π)ζU(p2), and hence U(πp
1 +
(1 − π)p2) = πU(p1) + (1 − π)U(p2). As demonstrated in Figure 1.6, this allows the
triangle diagrams for L(p1) and L(p2) to be connected, joining the indifference curves
in each to construct indifference planes which in turn define the triangle diagrams for
every L(πp1 + (1− π)p2). Repeated applications of independence allow us to extend
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this result to higher dimensions, and the utility representation over the entirety of the
mixture space to be constructed by taking some basis {p1, . . . , pn} of C and defining
the utility over each L(pi). For example, if C = ∆(X), then we may take X itself
as a basis, defining every lottery as p =
∑
x∈X p(x)δx. Then by defining a utility
function over outcomes u : X 7→ R such that δx ≃ ζu(x) for every x ∈ X , we have that
U(p) =
∑
x∈X p(x)u(x) for every p ∈ ∆(X), yielding the familiar representation.







1.2.2 Multiple Expected Utility
We now consider modifying the axioms to account for incompleteness, accomplished
by weakening negative transitivity in Axiom 1* to transitivity.
Axiom 1 (Strict Partial Order) For every p, q ∈ C, if p ≻ q then ¬(p ≺ q) and
for every p, q, r ∈ C, if p ≻ q and q ≻ r then p ≻ r.
Note that this also requires modifying our definitions of weak preference and indif-
ference. As shown in Dubra (2011) [9], a weak preference relation satisfying indepen-
dence, and any two of the axioms of completeness, Archimedean, or mixture continu-
ity, in the sense of Herstein and Milnor (1953) [15], must necessarily also satisfy the
third.
Property (Mixture Continuity - H-M) For every p, q, r ∈ C such that p ≻ q ≻ r,
the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp + (1 − α)q  r} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp + (1 − α)q  r} are
closed.
Therefore if completeness is relaxed then either the Archimedean axiom or mixture
continuity must be violated, even though they provide similar continuity properties.
To resolve this seeming contradiction, we adopt the convention of Karni (2011) [18]
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and use the following definition for weak preference.
Definition (Weak Preference) For every p, q ∈ C, p % q if and only if for every
r ∈ C, r ≻ p implies r ≻ q.
Definition (Indifference) For every p, q ∈ C, p ∼ q if and only if p % q and p - q.
Unlike the previously defined weak preference relation , the new definition % no
longer takes ≻ as its asymmetric part, which was the rationale for taking the strict
preference as the primitive in the first place. Note that % is transitive by construction
but complete if and only if ≻ is negatively transitive, while on the other hand 
was complete by the asymmetry of ≻ but transitive if and only if ≻ is negatively
transitive. Hence these two definitions agree only under completeness, otherwise % is
a strict subset of  in which case the relations defined so far are insufficient to fully
characterize preferences, as there may exist pairs of alternatives to which neither is
even weakly preferred to the other. To accommodate this possibility, we introduce
the following relation.
Definition (Incomparability) For every p, q ∈ C, p ≍ q if and only if ¬(p ≻ q) and
¬(p ≺ q).
The incomparability relation ≍ is defined here in a weak sense, indicating only that
neither lottery is strictly preferred to the other, and is an equivalence relation identical
to the indifference relation ∼ if and only if ≻ is negatively transitive, otherwise it
will be intransitive whenever the negation of ≻ is. Therefore the relation is set up to
encompass all instances of indecisive behavior, including both indifference and strict
incomparability. Note that this also requires a slight modification to the Archimedean
axiom, as if for example p ≻ r and q ≍ r we wish to still require that there is some
mixture αp+ (1− α)q ≻ r, which is not necessarily guaranteed by Axiom 2*.
Axiom 2 (Archimedean) For every p, q, r ∈ C if p ≻ r then there is α ∈ (0, 1) such
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that αp+(1−α)q ≻ r and if q ≺ r then there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that βp+(1−β)q ≺ r.
For example, if p represents a certain payoff of $100 and qα represents a lottery that
yields $300 with probability α and nothing otherwise, we may have that p ≍ q0.5 and
p ≍ q0.51, but by mixture monotonicity we must necessarily have that q0.51 ≻ q0.5 so
that ≍ is intransitive. Note that in this example since p is incomparable with two
distinct mixtures, one of which is strictly preferred to the other, there cannot be any
α for which p ∼ qα and therefore no expected utility representation of ≻ may exist.
However, is it evidently fruitful to consider the range of α for which p ≍ qα as a
starting point to construct a multi-utility representation, an idea which we will now
















Fig. 1.7: Definitions of Preference and Incomparability
If C is endowed with a topology, such as ∆(X) with the Euclidean metric, then allow-
ing for incompleteness can be understood as restricting a lottery’s upper and lower
contour sets, B(p) = {q ∈ C : q ≻ p} and W (p) = {q ∈ C : q ≺ p} respectively, only
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to be convex cones but not necessarily open half spaces, separated by an indifference
hyperplane by which the utility function may be defined. Figure 1.7a shows that
within the context of the triangle diagram, under incompleteness the incomparability
set I(p) = {q ∈ C : q ≍ p} may now have a non-empty interior, rather than con-
sisting only of the indifference curve intersecting p. Figure 1.7b shows how the two
definitions of weak preference may now differ, with % representing only the closure of
≻ while  is taken as the complement of ≺, so that the former excludes the interior
of the incomparability set while the latter includes it, with the two coinciding if and
only if ≻ is complete and this interior is empty. Note that the actual indifference re-
lation is typically sparse and here consists only of identical pairs, as it is given by the
intersection of the boundaries of the upper and lower contour sets. This reflects our
earlier assertion that the vast majority of instances where no preference is expressed
reflect incomparability, carrying none of implications of equivalence that indifference
represents.
If the independence axiom holds, then its substitution property can also be applied to
the incomparability relation, so that p ≍ q if and only if αp+(1−α)r ≍ αq+(1−α)r
for every α and r. Thus the incomplete preference analogue to the result of parallel
indifference curves under expected utility is that the shape of the incomparability set
is invariant. Intuitively, this implies that incomparability can neither be diluted nor
magnified by equally shifting the proportion of the common consequences in either
alternative. An individual who does not know whether she prefers coffee or tea will
remain unwaveringly indecisive regardless of the probability of receiving hot chocolate.
Hence, just as under completeness we can use comparisons between any lottery p and
mixtures of the p and p in order to generate utility functions over the entire plane
L(p), though now these utilities will merely be compatible with preferences, in the
sense of Aumann (1962) [2], rather than representing them. For every p ∈ C, define
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the set of incomparable mixtures as
A(p) = {α ∈ [0, 1] : p ≍ ζα}
By independence, each α ∈ A(p) defines a set of parallel incomparability curves
and hence a utility Uα : L(p) 7→ R by setting Uα(q) = λα + (1 − λ)θ for every
q = λp + (1 − λ)ζθ ∈ L(p). If p ≻ q, then q must lie below every incomparability
curve intersecting p, so that Uα(p) > Uα(q) for every α ∈ A(p). Therefore, collecting
the utilities in U(p) = {Uα : α ∈ A(p)} defines a multi-utility representation for ≻











Fig. 1.8: Multiple Expected Utility
As shown in Figure 1.8, in the triangle diagram incompleteness can be interpreted as
the decision maker being unsure of her attitude toward risk, so that her preferences
are given by multiple sets of parallel incomparability curves of varying steepness.
Demonstrating the results of Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) [10] and Galaabaatar
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and Karni (2012) [13], the set of utilities is itself given by a closed and convex cone, as
any incomparability curves of intermediate steepness between the two extremes also
define valid utilities. The diagram also shows the intransitivity of the incomparability
relation, as we have p ≍ q and p ≍ r, but q ≻ r. Intuitively, this arises because the
indecision is generated by the disagreement of different decision criteria which does
not obey transitivity even if each individual criterion does. Here only the most risk
averse evaluation scheme that the decision maker employs considers q to be equivalent
to p and every other utility judges it strictly better, while only the most risk seeking
utility function assigns equal value to r and p, which allows for all of them to agree
that q is strictly better than r.
Observe that at least in the two-dimensional case, the representation may be par-
simoniously defined by only a pair of utilities, representing the most and least risk
averse of the decision criteria corresponding to the upper and lower bounds of A(p),
with the entire cone given by taking linear combinations of these. As we shall see,
this result does not extend to the entirety of the mixture space, as a convex cone
in three or more dimensions requires arbitrarily many vectors to define and hence
even a parsimoniously defined representation may comprise infinitely many utilities.
Intuitively, in the two-dimensional case a utility is entirely defined by comparing p to
the set of mixtures ζα, which conflates the decision maker’s affinity for p and her risk
attitude. However, if we have p1 and p2 that do not lie on the same L(p), tastes must
also reflect the relative ranking of p1 and p2 in addition to the level of risk aversion,
and may in fact judge these to be incomparable, especially if they are not taken to
represent monetary values.
Recall that under completeness, the independence axiom further allowed the utility
functions defined over the individual planes to be connected across each L(p) to yield a
utility over the entirety of C. However, the intransitivity of≍ complicates matters here
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since this property relied on multiple applications of independence in succession. Note
that if αi ∈ A(pi) for i = 1, 2, then we must have that πp1+(1−π)p2 ≍ πζα1+(1−π)p
2
and πζα1 + (1 − π)p
2 ≍ πζα1 + (1 − π)ζα2 , but we may have πp
1 + (1 − π)p2 ≻
πζα1 + (1 − π)ζα2 . Therefore, since πα
1 + (1 − π)α2 /∈ A(πp1 + (1 − π)p2), there
can be no linear utility U : C 7→ R that coincides with Uα
i
over L(pi) for i = 1, 2.
This implies that the utilities over L(p) cannot be constructed simply by arbitrarily
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Fig. 1.9: Multiple Expected Utility in Three Dimensions





], so that each pi takes a range of utility values, from which we can generate multi-
utility representations for the restriction of ≻ to each L(pi). Even if we assume ≻ has a
parsimonious representation over C consisting of only a pair of utilities U = {U1, U2},
we are unable to determine it by simply observing the A(pi) alone. Figure 1.9a shows
the case where U1(p1) = U1(p2) = 2
3
and U2(p1) = U2(p2) = 1
3
, so that both of the
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decision criteria agree that p1 and p2 are equally good and hence p1 ∼ p2. Thus for
every π ∈ [0, 1], we have U1(πp1 + (1− π)p2) = 2
3
and U2(πp1 + (1− π)p2) = 1
3
, and




] and p1 ∼ πp1 + (1 − π)p2 ∼ p2. Intuitively, in
this case the utilities simply represent different levels of risk aversion, as the decision
maker considers p1 and p2 to be identical but is unable to compare either of them
against a range of mixtures ζα. On the other hand, Figure 1.9b shows the case in
which U1(p1) = U2(p2) = 2
3
and U1(p2) = U2(p1) = 1
3
, so that the utilities have
conflicting valuations of these elements, with U1 judging p1 to be strictly better and
U2 indicating the opposite, and p1 ≍ p2 arising from this disagreement. In this case,



















p2 ∼ ζ 1
2
. Here it is not risk
attitude that varies between U1 and U2 but the relative valuations of p1 and p2, with
the decision criteria just so happening to exactly agree on how to evaluate a mixture
of these in equal proportion.
Note that in both of these cases, the upper and lower contour sets are wedge-shaped,
though oriented differently in either instance, as the cones are formed by a pair of in-
comparability planes thus allowing for a non-trivial indifference relation to be defined
by their intersection. However, there exist an entire range of possible representations
between these extreme cases of total agreement and symmetric disagreement, as nei-
ther took into consideration elements in the interior of either A(pi). For example,
suppose for example that the parsimonious representation of ≻ requires four utility
functions which take the values given below.









































































Fig. 1.10: Multiple Expected Utility in Three Dimensions with Four Utilities





so that there are no other lotteries to which it is indifferent. Figure 1.10a shows that
the set of utilities U = {U1, U2, U3, U4} is generated by matching utilities over L(p1)
and L(p2) corresponding to three levels of risk aversion, including the intermediate
value represented by α = 1
2
that was not relevant in either of the previous examples.
Figure 1.10b shows that the incomparability plane intersecting p corresponding to any
utility in U is a supporting hyperplane for both B(p) andW (p), and furthermore that
plane corresponding to a utility in the closed convex cone generated by the elements
of U is a separating hyperplane between B(p) and W (p).
Given that under the independence axiom, the upper and lower contour sets retain
their shapes throughout C, reversing this principle gives us a procedure for finding
the representation. Following Baucells and Shapley (1998) [3], Dubra, Maccheroni,
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and Ok (2004) [10], and Galaabaatar and Karni (2012) [13], construct the domination
cone D = {λ(p− q) : p ≻ q, λ ≥ 0}, so that the set of utilities U is given by its dual
cone. Note that this result is entirely dependent on the independence axiom, which
ensures that p is strictly preferred to q if and only if p− q ∈ D and consequently that
p ≻ q ⇔ U(p) > U(q) ∀ U ∈ U
If C = ∆(X), define for every U ∈ U the utility over outcomes u : X 7→ R such that
u(x) = U(δx). Collecting these in Ũ = {u : U ∈ U}, we have that






q(x)u(x) ∀ u ∈ Ũ
1.2.3 Non-Expected Utility
We now switch our attention to relaxing the independence axiom. Recall that the in-
dependence axiom required that the triangle diagram consist of a single set of parallel
indifference curves under completeness, and multiple sets of parallel incomparability
curves under incompleteness. Therefore, violations of independence as in the Allais
paradox must imply that these curves have a different structure. Following the con-
struction of Chew (1989) [6], let C = ∆(X) for |X| = 3, and define p0 = δx2 and
q0 = αδx3 + (1 − α)δx1 for some α ∈ [0, 1]. For some β ∈ [0, 1] and i = 1, 2, 3, let
pi = βp0 + (1 − β)δxi and q
i = βq0 + (1 − β)δxi. Therefore, by assigning monetary
payoffs to the outcomes of {x1, x2, x3}={$0,$1m,$5m}, we can construct the Allais
paradox for some choice of α and β. The common consequence effect is given by
(α, β) = (10
11
, 0.11) and preferences of p2 ≻ q2 and p1 ≺ q1, and the common ratio
effect by (α, β) = (0.8, 0.05) and preferences of p0 ≻ q0 and p1 ≺ q1.










































Fig. 1.11: Allais Paradox
adhere to the Allais paradox do not have an expected utility representation, and thus
the indifference curves must either be non-linear or non-parallel. As shown in Chew,
Karni, and Safra (1987) [5], in the context of rank-dependent utility, preferences ex-
hibit risk aversion if both the utility and probability transformation functions are con-
cave, so that as demonstrated in Figure 1.11a the indifference curves will be concave
themselves, displaying an overall aversion to mixture of any kind. On the other hand,
if preferences adhere to the betweenness axiom and exhibit increasing risk aversion
in first-order stochastically dominant shifts as in Machina (1982) [22], then as shown
in Figure 1.11b, the indifference curves will be linear but fan out moving upwards
in the direction of δx3 − δx1 . Either of these may explain Allais-type behavior, but
for our purposes we will restrict our attention to the class of betweenness-conforming
preferences, as adapting rank-dependent models to account for incompleteness will
prove troublesome if the decision maker is unable to actually rank the outcomes.
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In lieu of independence, make the following assumptions on ≻.
Axiom 3 (Mixture Dominance) For every p, q, r ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1), if p ≻ r and
q ≻ r then αp+ (1− α)q ≻ r, and if p ≺ r and q ≺ r then αp+ (1− α)q ≺ r.
Axiom 4 (Betweenness) For every p, q ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1), p ≻ q if and only if
p ≻ αp+ (1− α)q ≻ q.
Note that Axioms 3 and 4 imply that the upper and lower contour sets of any mix-
ture are convex cones, without restricting them to have the same shape everywhere.
Together with Axiom 2 they maintain the useful properties of mixture continuity and
mixture monotonicity which were provided by independence in expected utility.
Lemma 1 (Mixture Continuity) If ≻ satisfies Axioms 2 and 3, then for every
p, q, r ∈ C, the sets {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+(1−α)q ≻ r} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+(1−α)q ≺ r}
are open, and {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+ (1− α)q ≍ r} is closed.
Lemma 2 (Mixture Monotonicity) If ≻ satisfies Axiom 4, then for every p, q ∈ C
and α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α > β, if p ≻ q then αp+ (1 − α)q ≻ βp + (1 − β)q, and
if p ≍ q then αp+ (1− α)q ≍ βp+ (1− β)q.
Therefore under betweenness, preferences must be monotonic in any direction that
exhibits either strict preference, indifference, or incomparability, so that in a triangle
diagram the indifference curves must be straight lines with increasing preference in the
direction of p− p. However, since we no longer have the strong substitution property
of the independence axiom, these lines no longer need to be parallel. Fishburn (1983)
[12] showed that complete preferences satisfying betweenness have a representation
by a continuous utility function U : C 7→ R where U(πp+ (1− π)q) is increasing, but
not necessarily linear, in π if p ≻ q and constant if p ∼ q. Dekel (1986) [8] further
showed that this utility is characterized by a function V : C × [0, 1] 7→ R that is linear
in its first argument and continuous in its second, so the utility is given by finding
28
























Fig. 1.12: Non-Expected Utility
Figure 1.12 shows the triangle diagram under non-expected utility, where the rep-
resentation can be thought of as defining functions Uα : L(p) 7→ R for α ∈ [0, 1]
such that each Uα generates a set of parallel lines of the same steepness as the in-
difference curve intersecting ζα, and setting U(q) = U
α(q) for every mixture lying
along this line. This interpretation bears some similarities to that of multi-utility
representations, with the set of Uα denoting decision criteria representing different
tastes, except that the decision maker evaluates each lottery by choosing one of these
utilities, rather than evaluating every lottery by all of them. In general, preferences
are given by a set of indifference hyperplanes which are not necessarily parallel, with
each mixture lying on such a plane assigned the utility value by the point ζα at which
it intersects the line connecting the best and worst elements.






























(b) Alternate “Grouping” of Incomparability
Curves
Fig. 1.13: Non-Expected Utility without Completeness
admit incompleteness may prove troublesome, since multi-utility models depend on
the substitution property of the independence axiom to provide structure from which
the representation can be constructed from a sparse set of comparisons, which is
lacking here. Figure 1.13 depicts the triangle diagram under preferences that satisfy
neither completeness nor independence, consisting of multiple sets of incomparability
curves which are not necessarily parallel. Note however that without any sort of
assumption that relates these curves to one another, actually defining the utilities
themselves proves difficult, since we cannot simply use the range of utility values
for p to generate the preferences over the entirety of L(p) as before. The matching
problem now manifests in two dimensions as well, as Figures 1.13a and 1.13b show two
different and equally valid groupings of incomparability curves into utility functions.
As the shapes of the upper and lower contour sets may vary arbitrarily, attempting
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to define utilities in terms of their supporting hyperplanes will prove fruitless as well.
1.2.4 Weighted Expected Utility
Evidently, in order to model preferences that satisfy neither independence nor com-
pleteness, we need to consider making another assumption that provides some sort of
substitution property, yet does not restrict the incomparability curves to be parallel.
In any event, we would gain little insight if the degree of incompleteness were allowed
to vary arbitrarily. Recall that when we observe fanning out property of Machina
(1982) [22], the indifference curves appear to converge at a single point lying outside
the triangle, so we now consider the assumption of Chew and MacCrimmon (1979)
[7] which gives exactly this property.
Axiom 5 (Weak Substitution) For every p, q ∈ C, p ≍ q if and only if for every
β ∈ (0, 1) there is γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every r ∈ C, βp+ (1− β)r ≍ γq+ (1− γ)r.
Note that Axiom 5 is slightly modified to use the incomparability relation rather
than indifference, as our objective is to extend the framework provided by weighted
expected utility theory to admit incompleteness, but as ≍ is transitive whenever
≻ is negatively transitive this axiom is equivalent to their assumption when ≻ is
complete. The weak substitution principle requires any pair of alternatives for which
an individual exhibits no decisive preference to maintain this relation if both are mixed
with any third lottery in some fixed proportions given by β and γ, without requiring
that these proportions be identical as under independence where β = γ. Note that
unlike the independence axiom there is no equivalent version of this property that
applies to either the strict or weak preference. Intuitively, it implies that even though
the decision maker may consider p and q to be incomparable, she may consider them
to have disparate degrees of influence on her perception of mixtures in which they
are components. Hence, for some β and r she may perceive βp+ (1− β)r to be more
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similar to p than βq + (1 − β)r is to q, requiring that the latter be moved closer
to q to compensate, so that βp + (1 − β)r ≍ γq + (1 − γ)r for some γ > β. The
following lemma, from Chew (1989) [6], shows that this property may be equivalently
expressed by assigning for each pair of incomparable lotteries a ratio τ = γ/(1−γ)
β/(1−β)
giving the weight that the decision maker attaches to p relative to q.
Lemma 3 (Ratio Substitution) If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every p, q ∈ C, if




Note that this odds ratio τ is necessarily unique under completeness, since if τ ′ < τ





∼ βp + (1 − β)p. This is not necessarily
the case if ≻ is incomplete however, so define for every p, q,
T (p, q) =
{
τ ≥ 0 : βp+ (1− β)r ≍
βτq + (1− β)r
βτ + (1− β)
∀ β ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ C
}
If p ≍ q, then any τ ≥ 0 satisfying ratio substitution between them uniquely defines
a source point o from which a set of incomparability curves originates, since for every
β ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ C we have by betweenness that for every λ ∈ R,
βp+ (1− β)r ≍ λ[βp+ (1− β)r] + (1− λ)
[
βτq + (1− β)r












βτ + (1− β)
]
r
The source point is defined as the intersection of all of the incomparability curves
connecting βp+ (1− β)r to βτq+(1−β)r
βτ+(1−β)
for each β and r, and can thus be located by
































Therefore, the source point o lies on the extension of the line connecting the incom-
parable alternatives p and q, and is placed to the left of p if τ < 1 and to the right
of q if τ > 1, approaching a point infinitely distant as τ approaches unity from either
direction. As τ = 1 indicates that p and q satisfy the strong substitution property
of independence, the incomparability curves that o projects will be parallel in this
case, thus obeying the results of expected utility. Equivalently, since τ satisfies ratio
substitution if and only if γ = βτ
βτ+(1−β)









Hence were the source point itself considered a lottery, it would be deemed incompa-
rable to any alternative, which can be demonstrated simply by drawing an incompa-
rability curve originating from o through it.
Figure 1.14 shows the nature of preferences if independence is relaxed to weak sub-
stitution. Here the decision maker is indifferent between p and some mixture of the
best and worst outcomes q = ζα, but has a distorted perception of mixture that
under-weights p relative to q. Hence she perceives both βp + (1 − β)p to be closer
to p, and hence better, than βq + (1 − β)p is, while viewing βp + (1 − β)p as closer
to p and worse than βq + (1 − β)p. Thus some τ < 1 satisfies ratio substitution, or
equivalently that weak substitution is satisfied for some γ < β. This implies that the
indifference curves converge at a source o = p−τq
1−τ
lying to the left of p, and hence obey

















Fig. 1.14: Weighted Expected Utility
prospects improve in terms of an upward shift in the direction p − p. Alternatively,
if some τ > 1 satisfied ratio substitution, then p would be over-weighted relative to
q and the source o would be located to the right of q, so that the indifference curves
would instead fan in and the decision maker’s risk attitude would vary in the opposite
manner.
While the Allais paradox implies that indifference curves should fan out in the lower
half of the simplex, given that it relates to mixtures of p and q with the worst element
p, it is not quite so clear that this same pattern should continue in the upper half
as well. Note that the interpretation of the effect in the lower half relies on the
decision maker viewing p as the “safe” alternative, so that she becomes more willing
to exchange it for the risky bet q as the the probability of receiving the worst possible
outcome p increases. In the upper half however, if the probability of receiving the best
element p is sufficiently high, then the choice may instead be framed as a possibility
of loss from a default of p, in which case receiving p is no longer seen as a gain but a
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disappointment that the decision maker wishes to avoid. Gul (1991) [14] proposes a
theory of disappointment aversion under which indifference curves become shallower














Fig. 1.15: Disappointment Aversion
As shown in Figure 1.15, preferences under disappointment aversion are given by
indifference curves projected from a pair of source points. If p ∼ q = ζα, then
under the symmetry assumption there is τ ≥ 0 such that for every β we have that
βp + (1− β)r ∼ βτq+(1−β)r
βτ+(1−β)r







for r ≻ p, with
ρ = 1−τ
τ
giving the disappointment aversion parameter. Hence if τ < 1 and thus





q lying to the left of p and fan out, while those in the upper half are








q lying to the right of q and fan in. Therefore, the
degree of risk aversion decreases moving away from p in either direction.










Fig. 1.16: Semi-Weighted Expected Utility
metry condition, showing that if ratio substitution is weakened to allow the odds ratio
τ = γ/(1−γ)
β/(1−β)
to depend on the third alternative r being mixed in, then the indifference
curves are exactly those as in Dekel (1986) [8]. If the dependence of τ on r is allowed
only for degenerate lotteries then, as depicted in Figure 1.16, there exist a pair of
source points o and o arbitrarily located on the extended line between p and q, rather
than reflections of each other as under disappointment aversion.
This class of semi-weighted utility models thus induces a kink in the state-contingent
indifference map along the certainty line, as depicted in Figure 1.17. For our purposes
however, we will maintain the basic form of the ratio substitution property where the
odds ratio τ is independent of r. Under incompleteness we cannot simply partition
the simplex into upper and lower halves since depending on how these are defined
they would either overlap at or omit the set of incomparable lotteries, and given the
effects of relaxing completeness in the expected utility model, it is rather self-evident




Fig. 1.17: State-Contingent Diagram of Semi-Weighted Expected Utility
To derive the weighted expected utility representation note that, as under expected
utility, the structure of indifference map for any plane L(p) is generated simply by
investigating p itself, though here both its utility and weight need to be set to define
these values over the entirety of L(p). Under completeness, the indifference curves
originating from the source point partition L(p) into equivalence classes so that defin-
ing U : L(p) 7→ R such that p ∼ ζU(p), we have that p ≻ q if and only if U(p) > U(q),
though U is not necessarily a linear function as under expected utility. Define the
weight function W : L(p) 7→ R such that for every q ∈ L(p), W (q) is the odds ratio
τ = γ/(1−γ)
β/(1−β)
satisfying substitution between q and ζU(q), so that for every β and r we
have
βq + (1− β)r ∼
βW (q)ζU(q) + (1− β)r
βW (q) + (1− β)
We can easily check that U is a weighted linear function, takingW as its linear weight
function. For every p, q and π ∈ [0, 1], since p ∼ ζU(p), we have by ratio substitution
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that for every β and r that
β[πp+ (1− π)q] + (1− β)r ∼
βπW (p)ζU(p) + β(1− π)q + (1− β)r
βπW (p) + β(1− π) + (1− β)
Furthermore, since q ∼ ζU(q) we have by another application of ratio substitution that
βπW (p)ζU(p) + β(1− π)q + (1− β)r
βπW (p) + β(1− π) + (1− β)
∼
βπW (p)ζU(p) + β(1− π)W (q)ζU(q) + (1− β)r
βπW (p) + β(1− π)W (q) + (1− β)
Hence by the transitivity of the indifference relation,
β(πp+ (1− π)q) + (1− β)r ∼
βπW (p)ζU(p) + β(1− π)W (q)ζU(q) + (1− β)r
βπW (p) + β(1− π)W (q) + (1− β)
=
β[πW (p) + (1− π)W (q)]ζπW (p)U(p)+(1−π)W (q)U(q)
πW (p)+(1−π)W (q)
+ (1− β)r
β[πW (p) + (1− π)W (q)] + (1− β)
Thus we have that the utility and weight functions (U,W ) form a weighted linear
pair
U(πp+ (1− π)q) =
πW (p)U(p) + (1− π)W (q)U(q)
πW (p) + (1− π)W (q)
W (πp+ (1− π)q) = πW (p) + (1− π)W (q)
Figure 1.18 shows the interpretation of the utility and weight functions in the two-




q = λp+(1−λ)ζθ ∈ L(p). Hence, the utility value is found by extending a line from o
through q to intersect the best-worst line at ζU(q), and the weight taken as the ratio of
the distance between o and q and distance between o and ζU(q). Thus, lotteries lying
on any vertical line parallel to p− p have equal weight, while any mixture ζα on the
best-worst line itself is assigned unit weight under this scheme, so that in addition to















Fig. 1.18: Interpretation of Weighted Utility
formulation also normalizes the weights such that W (p) = W (p) = 1.
Now consider extending this representation to the entirety of C. Suppose we have
p1, p2 ∈ C such that p1 ∼ p2 ∼ ζα, then for i = 1, 2 we have that there is some
τ i ≥ 0 satisfying ratio substitution between pi and ζα, and consequently a source
point located at oi = p
i−τ iζα
1−τ i
. Furthermore, we have by two applications of ratio
substitution that for any β and r that
βp1 + (1− β)r ∼
βτ 1ζα + (1− β)r










Therefore we have that τ ∗ = τ
1
τ2
in turn satisfies ratio substitution between p1 and p2,
thus clarifying the notion of the odds ratio representing the relative weight between
two lotteries, as τ i = W (pi) for i = 1, 2 and hence τ ∗ = W (p
1)
W (p2)
. Moreover, this implies
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that there is a third source point located at
o∗ =
p1 − τ ∗p2
1− τ ∗
=
τ 2p1 − τ 1p2 − τ 1τ 2ζα + τ
1τ 2ζα
τ 2 − τ 1
=
τ 2(p1 − τ 1ζα)− τ
1(p2 − τ 1ζα)
τ 2 − τ 1
=
τ 2(1− τ 1)
τ 2 − τ 1
p1 − τ 1ζα
1− τ 1
−
τ 1(1− τ 2)
τ 2 − τ 1
p2 − τ 2ζα
1− τ 2
=
(1− τ 1)o1 − τ ∗(1− τ 2)o2
1− τ ∗
Hence, given the three mixtures p1, p2, and ζα that define an indifference plane, the
three source points that define their pairwise substitutability must all lie on the same
line. This source line projects a set of indifference planes over the three-dimensional
























Fig. 1.19: Weighted Expected Utility in Three Dimensions
Figure 1.19 depicts weighted utility in three dimensions, so that the indifference plane
given by p1, p2, and ζα defines three source points o
1, o2, and o∗ lying on the same
line. Note that o∗ lies to the right of p2 implying that τ ∗ > 1 and hence τ 1 > τ 2.
For any α′ ∈ [0, 1], define β = 1−α
′
1−α









for i = 1, 2, we have that q1, q2, and ζ ′α define another indifference
plane projected from the same source line. Conversely, the source line itself is found
by taking the intersection of any two indifference planes, so that the planes are parallel
if and only if the odds ratio between any pair of lotteries lying on either is fixed at
unity, as under the independence axiom. In general, a mixture space of dimension n
consists of indifference hyperplanes of dimension n−1, projected from a source space
of dimension n − 2, so that any k-tuple of pairwise indifferent lotteries is projected
from a set of k(k−1)
2
source points that lie on a hyperplane of dimension k − 2.
Thus if we have a basis {p1, . . . , pn} of C and (U(pi),W (pi)) = (αi, τ i) such that source




for i = 1, . . . , n, then for any q =
∑n
i=1 π
ipi ∈ C we










































iτ i] + (1− β)
=
βW (q)ζU(q) + (1− β)r
βW (q) + (1− β)r













If C = ∆(X), we may take X as the basis and define u : X 7→ R and w : X 7→ R+ such
that u(x) = U(δx) and w(x) = W (δx) for every x ∈ X . Then for every p, q ∈ ∆(X)
we have that










Note that just as the multi-utility representation relied on the independence axiom
to obtain its result, the weighted utility representation relies on the completeness
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axiom and the transitivity of the indifference relation in order to build up the utility
function to take its weighted linear form.
1.3 Conclusion
In the preceding sections we have considered models where preferences either violate
completeness and satisfy independence, or vice versa, and considered how their con-
clusions might extend to a general setting where neither of these axioms hold. We
have seen that in the multi-utility model, the indifference curves of expected utility
are replaced by multiple sets of parallel incomparability curves that exhibit varying
tastes, all of which must agree on a ranking of two lotteries for the decision maker to
express a strict preference. On the other hand, in weighted utility model, the indiffer-
ence curves are no longer parallel but instead are projected from a common source, so
that the location of this point determines both the decision maker’s attitude towards
and perception of risk.
The road map to modeling preferences that satisfy neither completeness nor indepen-
dence is now clear, as the indifference map should consist of multiple source points
projecting multiple sets of incomparability curves that each may fan either in or out
to varying degrees. As demonstrated in Figure 1.20a, the locations of these source
points may correspond to different values of either α or τ , and thus may represent
either multiple utility functions or multiple weight functions, corresponding to incom-
pleteness in either tastes or perceptions. In higher dimensions, as in Figure 1.20b, we
see that the structure of preferences must be such that the upper and lower contour
sets are convex cones but not necessarily half spaces, as they would be under com-
pleteness, and that their shape varies moving around the space of mixtures, unlike in
models where independence holds, so that the degree of incompleteness is also vari-




























Fig. 1.20: Multiple Weighted Expected Utility
and weight w : X 7→ R+ functions such that










∀; (u, w) ∈ Ṽ
Note that the multiple weighted expected utility representation above admits as spe-
cial cases the multi-utility models of Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok [10] and Galaabaatar
and Karni (2012) [13] if w(·) is a constant function for every (u, w) ∈ Ṽ, or the
weighted utility model of Chew and MacCrimmon (1979) [7] if Ṽ is a singleton, re-
ducing to standard expected utility if both hold.
The next chapter will provide a formal proof for the representation theorem of the
multiple weighted expected utility model, and the final chapter will explore some
special cases of the general model, specifically those where the set of decision criteria
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consists of a multiple utilities paired with a single weight function Ṽ = Ũ × {w},
or multiple weighting schemes paired with a single utility Ṽ = {u} × W̃ , so that
incompleteness is restricted to either tastes or perception alone.
44
2. WEIGHTED EXPECTED UTILITY WITHOUT THE
COMPLETENESS AXIOM
2.1 Overview
In the preceding chapter, we examined various models of choice under risk for pref-
erences that violate either the completeness or independence axioms and considered
how their results might be extended to a general framework where neither of these
assumptions holds. We will now present a formal characterization of such a model,
using the weighted expected utility setup of Chew and MacCrimmon (1979) [7] and
relaxing the assumption of negative transitivity that ensures completeness. Recall the
previously established setup, where ≻ is a strict preference relation over a mixture
space C, that obeys the following assumptions.
Axiom 1 (Strict Partial Order) For every p, q ∈ C, if p ≻ q then ¬(p ≺ q) and
for every p, q, r ∈ C, if p ≻ q and q ≻ r then p ≻ r.
Axiom 2 (Archimedean) For every p, q, r ∈ C if p ≻ r then there is α ∈ (0, 1) such
that αp+(1−α)q ≻ r and if q ≺ r then there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that βp+(1−β)q ≺ r.
Axiom 3 (Mixture Dominance) For every p, q, r ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1), if p ≻ r and
q ≻ r then αp+ (1− α)q ≻ r, and if p ≺ r and q ≺ r then αp+ (1− α)q ≺ r.
Axiom 4 (Betweenness) For every p, q ∈ C and α ∈ (0, 1), p ≻ q if and only if
p ≻ αp+ (1− α)q ≻ q.
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Axiom 5 (Weak Substitution) For every p, q ∈ C, p ≍ q if and only if for every
β ∈ (0, 1) there is γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every r ∈ C, βp+ (1− β)r ≍ γq+ (1− γ)r.
The objective of this chapter will be to show that a preference relation satisfying these
axioms has a multiple weighted expected utility representation. That is, ≻ is given by
the agreement of a set of decision criteria, each of which in turn has a representation
by a weighted linear utility function paired with a linear weight function.
Definition (Weighted Linearity) A weighted linear pair consists of a utility func-
tion U : C 7→ R and W : C 7→ R+ such that for every p, q ∈ C and π ∈ [0, 1], we have
that
U(πp+ (1− π)q) =
πW (p)U(p) + (1− π)W (q)U(q)
πW (p) + (1− π)W (q)
W (πp+ (1− π)q) = πW (p) + (1− π)W (q)
Theorem 1 A preference relation ≻ over a convex subset C of a finite dimensional
linear space L is bounded and satisfies Axioms 1-5 if and only if there is a set V of
weighted linear pairs such that for every p, q ∈ C,
p ≻ q ⇔ U(p) > U(q) ∀ (U,W ) ∈ V
If the space of mixtures is a set of lotteries ∆(X) over a finite set of prizes X , then
every weighted linear pair (U,W ) defines utility and weight functions over outcomes
u : X 7→ R and w : X 7→ R+ by setting u(x) = U(δx) and w(x) = W (δx) for every
x ∈ X , so that for every p =
∑










An immediate corollary to Theorem 1 gives the representation of a preference relation
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over ∆(X) satisfying the enumerated axioms, characterizing each of the decision
criteria (U,W ) ∈ V as a weighted expected value.
Corollary to Theorem 1 A preference relation≻ over ∆(X) is bounded and satisfies
Axioms 1-5 if and only if there is a set Ṽ of utility-weight pairs such that for every
p, q ∈ C,










∀ (u, w) ∈ Ṽ
Observe that the representation above admits the models considered in the preceding
chapter as special cases, taking the form of multi-utility whenever each weight function
is constant, weighted utility whenever the set of decision criteria is a singleton, and
expected utility if both of these are true. In general Ṽ may take a number of forms,
possibly consisting of a multiple utility functions Ṽ = Ũ × {w}, multiple weight
functions Ṽ = {u} × W̃ , or both Ṽ = Ũ × W̃ .
2.2 Model
To obtain our result, we will first consider the construction of a multiple weighted
expected utility representation over the restriction of ≻ to some plane L(p), defined as
before as the space spanned by the vectors p−p and p−p. The overall representation
is then established by connecting the indifference maps over the individual L(p) to one
another, matching the decision criteria defined on these planes to generate utilities
over the entirety of C.
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2.2.1 Two-Dimensional Model
Fix some p ∈ C and consider the restriction of the preference relation ≻ to L(p).
Since p ≻ p ≻ p, there exists a range of mixtures of the best and worst elements to
which p is incomparable, p ≍ αp + (1 − α)p ≡ ζα. The following lemma shows that
this range is a closed interval.
Lemma 4 (Solvability) If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-4, then for every p, q, r ∈ C such
that p ≻ r ≻ q there are α, α ∈ [0, 1] such that r ≍ αp + (1 − α)q if and only if
α ∈ [α, α].
Thus the set of mixtures ζα to which p is incomparable gives the range of normalized
utility values which p may take.
A(p) = {α ∈ [0, 1] : p ≍ ζα} = [α(p), α(p)]
Recall that under independence a multi-utility representation could be defined by
a pair of functions corresponding to α(p) and α(p), corresponding to the most risk
averse and risk loving of the decision criteria, respectively. While this is not possible
here, we will show that the elements of A(p) can still generate a representation over
the entirety of L(p). For any incomparable pair p ≍ q, denote the set of odds ratios
τ = γ/(1−γ)
β/(1−β)
for β, γ satisfying weak substitution as
T (p, q) =
{
τ ≥ 0 : βp+ (1− β)r ≍
βτq + (1− β)r
βτ + (1− β)
∀β ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ C
}
Note that T (p, q) was a singleton under completeness but need not be so here, and
that each τ ∈ T (p, q) represents the weight of p relative to q according to some scheme
that attaches disparate levels of importance to the various lotteries as components
of mixtures. Therefore, if α ∈ A(p) and τ ∈ T (p, ζα), then the pair (α, τ) defines a
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utility-weight pair associated with p. Define the set of all such pairs for any p ∈ C as
Φ(p) =
{
(α, τ) : βp+ (1− β)r ≍
βτζα + (1− β)r
βτ + (1− β)
∀ β ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ C
}
Note that as Φ(p) = {(1, 1)} and Φ(p) = {(1, 0)}, the utilities and weights we will


































Fig. 2.1: Locating the Source
Each φ = (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p) defines a set of incomparability curves over L(p) converging














As shown in Figure 2.1 the source point oφ is located in the Machina (1982) [22]
49
triangle diagram by drawing a similar triangle intersecting the simplex at p for τ <
1 or extending the simplex for τ > 1, and extending the line between p and ζα
to intersect the opposite edge. The pair (α, τ) defines a useful coordinate system
which we will take advantage of throughout the course of this analysis. Since p =
τζα + (1− τ)o
φ, the odds ratio determines the distance of the source point from the
simplex itself τ = ‖p−o
φ‖
‖ζα−oφ‖
. As the fanning effect of the incomparability curves is
magnified as the source is moved closer to the simplex, the deviation of the odds ratio
from unity determines the degree to which the decision maker’s perception of risk
is distorted from what the independence axiom would prescribe, and hence τ gives






note that the vector oτ − oτ is parallel to p− p, and the source point is located at the
intersection of the line connecting oτ and oτ and the incomparability curve connecting
p with ζα, so that o
φ = αoτ + (1 − α)oτ , and α gives the “vertical” location of the
source point.
The critical observation here is that each source point, and consequently the incom-
parability curves it projects, is defined irrespective of the actual lottery p used to
locate it, and therefore Φ(p) uniquely determines Φ(q) for any q ∈ L(p).
Lemma 5 If ≻ satisfies Axiom 5, then for every p ∈ C, (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p) if and only if






Therefore, from each φ = (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p) we can define utility Uφ : L(p) 7→ R and
weight W φ : L(p) 7→ R+ functions by setting for every q = λp+ (1− λ)ζθ ∈ L(p),
Uφ(q) =
λτα + (1− λ)θ
λτ + (1− λ)
W φ(q) = λτ + (1− λ)
It is easily verified that (Uφ,W φ) is a weighted linear pair, since if qi = λip+(1−λi)ζθi
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for i = 1, 2 and π ∈ [0, 1] we have
πq1 + (1− π)q2 = π[λ1p+ (1− λ1)ζθ1] + (1− π)[λ
2p+ (1− λ2)ζθ2]
= [πλ1 + (1− π)λ2]p+ [π(1− λ1)ζθ1 + (1− π)(1− λ
2)ζθ2]
Uφ(πq1 + (1− π)q2) =
[πλ1 + (1− π)λ2]τα + [π(1− λ1)θ1 + (1− π)(1− λ2)θ2]
[πλ1 + (1− π)λ2]τ + [π(1− λ1) + (1− π)(1− λ2)]
=
π[λ1τα + (1− λ1)θ1] + (1− π)[λ2τ + (1− λ2)θ2]
π[λ1τ + (1− λ1)] + (1− π)[λ2τ + (1− λ2)]
=
πW φ(q1)Uφ(q1) + (1− π)W φ(q2)Uφ(q2)
πW φ(q1) + (1− π)W φ(q2)
W φ(πq1 + (1− π)q2) = [πλ1 + (1− π)λ2]τ + [π(1− λ1) + (1− π)(1− λ2)]
= π[λ1τ + (1− λ1)] + (1− π)[λ2τ + (1− λ2)]
= πW φ(q1) + (1− π)W φ(q2)
By Lemma 5 we have that φ′ ∈ Φ(q) if and only if there is φ ∈ Φ(p) such that
φ′ = (Uφ(q),W φ(q)). Repeat this for each φ ∈ Φ(p) and collect these functions in
V(p) = {(Uφ,W φ) : φ ∈ Φ(p)}.
Figure 2.2 shows the construction of V(p), as each φ ∈ Φ(p) defines a set of incompa-
rability curves that converge at the source point oφ, and defines a preference relation
≻φ which has a a weighted expected utility representation by a pair of functions
(Uφ,W φ). The actual preferences are defined by the agreement of each of these, so
that p ≻ q if and only if p ≻φ q for every φ ∈ Φ(p). Hence the overall indifference map
is therefore constructed by superimposing the incomparability curves generated by
each φ ∈ Φ(p), yielding upper and lower contour sets which do not necessarily main-
tain their shape throughout the space of mixtures. In the example given, we have
that U(p) < U(q) but U ′(p) > U ′(q), so that the two decision criteria disagree on how
to rank p and q and according they lie in each other’s incomparability sets so that


















Fig. 2.2: Interpretation of Multiple Weighted Utility
other’s incomparability sets. This also indicates how the collection of decision criteria
V(p) represents ≻. Any point o′′ on the line connecting two sources must itself be a
source, as the incomparability curve originating from it through any q ∈ L(p) must
lie between the corresponding curves originating from o and o′. Conversely therefore,
given any pair of incomparable lotteries such as p and q, there must exist a source
point o′′ on the extended line between them, so that further extending this line to
intersect the line connecting p and p shows that the utility function generated by o′′
assigns the same value to both p and q. The following lemma formalizes this result.
Lemma 6 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every q1, q2 ∈ L(p), q1 ≍ q2 if and only
if U(q1) = U(q2) for some (U,W ) ∈ V(p).
The proof that V(p) represents ≻ thus follows directly from this, since if q2 does not
lie on any of the incomparability curves intersecting q1, it must either lie above or
below all of them, implying that q2 is either strictly better or strictly worse than q1.
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Lemma 7 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every q1, q2 ∈ L(p), q1 ≻ q2 if and only
if U(q1) > U(q2) for every (U,W ) ∈ V(p).
Thus, the restriction of the preference relation ≻ to any two-dimensional slice L(p) of
the simplex has a multiple weighted expected utility representation, found by taking
the set of utility-weight pairs Φ(p) that satisfy both solvability and ratio substitution.
Each such pair φ ∈ Φ(p) defines a source point that projects a set of incomparability
curves and hence generates a weighted linear pair (Uφ,W φ) representing a complete
preference relation ≻φ where q1 ≻φ q2 if and only if Uφ(q1) > Uφ(q2). Since q1 ≻ q2
if and only if q1 ≻φ q2 for every φ ∈ Φ(p), collecting all the utility-weight pairs
constructed from Φ(p) defines a set V(p) that forms the desired representation of ≻.
2.2.2 General Model
We now consider the problem of obtaining a multiple weighted expected utility rep-
resentation for ≻ over the entire space C. Let U : C 7→ R and W : C 7→ R+ denote
utility and weight functions over C such that (U,W ) is weighted linear, U(p1) = U(p2)
implies p1 ≍ p2, and p1 ≻ p2 implies U(p1) > U(p2). This utility function is com-
patible with the preference ≻ in the sense of Aumann (1962) [2], but does alone
represent it. This implies for every p ∈ C that (U(p),W (p)) ∈ Φ(p) and hence that
there is (Up,W p) ∈ V(p) such that (Up(q),W p(q)) = (U(q),W (q)) for every q ∈ L(p).
Hence, similar to multi-utility models under independence, the problem of finding
a representation for ≻ over C reduces to matching the utility-weight pairs over the
individual V(p) to one another, constructing a set V of weighted linear pairs such
that (U,W ) ∈ V if and only if the restriction of (U,W ) to L(p) is an element of V(p)
for every p ∈ C.
Suppose we have p1, p2 ∈ C for which p2 /∈ L(p1) and φi = (αi, τ i) ∈ Φ(pi) for i = 1, 2.
For the sake of brevity, given π ∈ [0, 1] let pπ ≡ πp1 + (1 − π)p2 and denote the
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weighted linear mixture of the utility-weight pairs as
φπ ≡ πφ1 ⊕ (1− π)φ2 =
(
πτ 1α1 + (1− π)τ 2α2
πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2
, πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2
)
If ≻ has a multiple weighted utility representation over C, then for every pair (U,W ) ∈
V we have that φi = (U(pi),W (pi)) ∈ Φ(pi) for i = 1, 2. By the weighted linearity of
(U,W ), for every π we must have that φπ = πφ1 ⊕ (1− π)φ2 ∈ Φ(pπ) and hence that
U(q) = Uφ
π




for i = 1, 2, we
have for every π that there is a source point located at
oπ ≡
[πp1 + (1− π)p2]− [πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2]ζπτ1α1+(1−π)τ2α2
πτ1+(1−π)τ2
1[πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2]
=
π(p1 − τ 1ζα1) + (1− π
1)(p2 − τ 2ζα2)
π(1− τ 1) + (1− π1)(1− τ 2)
=
π(1− τ 1)o1 + (1− π)(1− τ 2)o2
π(1− τ 1) + (1− π)(1− τ 2)
Hence each (U,W ) ∈ V corresponds to defining a source line O = {oπ : π ∈ [0, 1]} that
projects a set of incomparability planes over the space
⋂
π∈[0,1]L(p
π), though in fact
by betweenness the incomparability plane and hence the source line may be infinitely
extended to encompass any π ∈ R. Note however that just as in models of incomplete
preferences with independence, this matching cannot be done arbitrarily due to the
intransitivity of the incomparability relation. Suppose we have (αi, τ i) ∈ Φ(pi) for































the incomparability curves through p1 and p2 are respectively projected from the sets














]} ⊆ L(p2). Suppose that V is characterized by a pair of decision criteria
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Fig. 2.3: Representation by Two Weighted Linear Utilities
As shown in Figure 2.3, both of the decision criteria represent identical weight
schemes, but assign a range of utility values to every pπ. Observe that the source
lines O and O′ respectively representing (U,W ) and (U ′,W ′) are defined by connecting
source points in S1 and S2, and furthermore every point lying on either line is itself a
source, so that both lines project sets of incomparability planes. Note that for π∗ = 2
5
,
the utilities exactly coincide so that U(pπ
∗
























) is given by the intersection




, its upper and lower contour sets are
wedge-shaped, similar to how they would be if preferences were represented by a pair
of linear utilities. Note however that even though the line O∗ also connects points in
S1 and S2, it is not a source line, as the plane it would project through pπ
∗
intersects
























Fig. 2.4: Locating the Source Lines
Recall that in the preceding chapter, we showed that constructing a multi-utility rep-
resentation relied on applying the independence axiom, while constructing a weighted
utility representation used the completeness axiom. Figure 2.4 shows that since nei-
ther of those properties holds here, we cannot use the same techniques to find our
representation. In the models of Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) [10] and Galaa-
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bataar and Karni (2012) [13], the problem of matching utilities was resolved by ob-
serving that the shape of the upper contour set B(p) was identical at every p ∈ C
as a result of the independence axiom, and hence taking the set of supporting hy-
perplanes of any B(p) defined the set of utilities. Note here however that letting
q = βpπ
∗
+ (1 − β)p and q = βpπ
∗
+ (1 − β)p, no supporting hyperplane of B(q) is
also a supporting hyperplane of B(q). Indeed, there is no easily defined analogue of
the domination cone D = {λ(p − q) : p ≻ q, λ ≥ 0} within this setup, as Axiom 5
cannot be equivalently expressed in terms of strict preference the same way that the
independence axiom can. On the other hand, in the weighted utility model of Chew
and MacCrimmon (1979) [7], taking the intersection of any pair of indifference planes
gave the unique source line, and any other plane projected from this line would also
be an indifference plane. Observe that this result does not translate here either, as
the lines O∗ and O∗∗ lie at the intersection of two incomparability planes, but are
not composed of source points and hence do not themselves project incomparability
planes.
In order to begin the process of defining a representation here, recall a property
established in the preceding section that the source points are defined irrespective of
the lotteries used to locate them. Thus given any (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p) that defines a source
point o = p−τζα
1−τ
, by Lemma 5 we can for any (α′, τ ′) find some p′ ∈ L(p) such that
(α′, τ ′) ∈ Φ(p′) by setting
p′ = τ ′ζα′ + (1− τ








τ ′ − τ
1− τ
ζ τ ′(1−τ)α′−τ(1−τ ′)α
τ ′(1−τ)−τ(1−τ ′)
Therefore, given any basis {p1, . . . , pn} of C and (αi, τ i) ∈ Φ(pi) for i = 1, . . . , n, we
can instead fix (α, τ) and find qi ∈ L(pi) such that (α, τ) ∈ Φ(qi) for every i. If we can
find a source hyperplane such that (α, τ) ∈ Φ(
∑n
i=1 π




i = 1, then we can define a weighted linear pair (U,W ) over C by
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setting (U(q),W (q)) = (α, τ) for every q =
∑n
i=1 π
iqi, and applying Lemma 5 to define
(U,W ) over the plane L(q). Since {q1, . . . , qn} will span C as well, this defines (U,W )
over the entirety of the mixture space. The set of decision criteria V may then be
constructed by finding every such {q1, . . . , qn} that defines such a source hyperplane
relative to the pair (α, τ). To establish the existence of a representation, we begin by
showing the preliminary result that any pair of alternatives are incomparable if and
only if the entire line between them shares a utility value in common.
Lemma 8 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-4, then for every p1, p2 ∈ C, p1 ≍ p2 if and only if
there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that πp1 + (1− π)p2 ≍ ζα for every π ∈ R.
Lemma 8 shows that two lotteries are incomparable if and only if there is some
incomparability plane on which they both lie, which can be extended to intersect some
ζα that defines a utility value α such that p
π ≍ ζα for every π. By ratio substitution





source point for every τπ ∈ T (pπ, ζα). Note however that a common utility value does
not alone ensure the existence of a source line, since this would additionally require
that there are weights τ 1, τ 2 such that πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2 ∈ T (pπ, ζα) for every π, thus
defining a linear weight function and hence a weighted linear utility function.
As shown in Figure 2.5 for i = 1, 2 the incomparability curves intersecting pi are






: (αi, τ i) ∈ Φ(pi)
}
⊆ L(pi), which
are each triangular so that both p1 and p2 exhibit multiplicity of both utilities and
weights. By Lemma 8 p1 ≍ p2 if and only if the entire line connecting them lies on an
incomparability plane and shares the utility value α in common. Observe that every
source point oπ that projects incomparability curves over L(pπ) lies on a source line
O connecting some o1 ∈ S1 and o2 ∈ S2, but that not every line connecting points in
S1 and S2 is a source line, as O∗ would assign the utility value α∗ to pπ even though
























Fig. 2.5: Common Utility Value Defines an Incomparability Plane
As shown in Figure 2.6, for every π we have that pπ ≍ ζα, and hence by ratio




projecting a set of incomparability curves over L(pπ). The source line O is constructed
by picking τ i ∈ T (pi, ζα) for i = 1, 2 such that τ
π ≡ πτ 1 + (1 − π)τ 2 ∈ T (pπ, ζα) for




π) by letting (U(pπ),W (pπ)) = (α, τπ) for every π.
As with the utilities, these weight values cannot be matched arbitrarily, since O′ is
not a source line as it assigns a weight to pπ that lies outside of the range T (pπ, ζα).
In order to find the set of valid source lines, we apply Lemma 5 once again, reducing

















Fig. 2.6: Range of Weight Values for A Single Utility Value
of them shares a utility-weight pair (α, τ) in common.
Suppose that we have p, p′ ∈ C such that p ≍ p′, and hence for some α we have that
πp+(1−π)p′ ≍ ζα for every π. If a source line exists then there are τ ∈ T (p, ζα) and
τ ′ ∈ T (p′, ζα) such that (α, πτ + (1− π)τ
′) ∈ Φ(πp+ (1− π)p′) for every π. Suppose









(α, τ) ∈ Φ(q). Furthermore, since we have for every π ∈ [0, 1] that










π(1− τ)p + (1− π)(1− τ ′)p′ + (1− π)(τ ′ − τ)ζα
1− τ
≡ λ′[π′p+ (1− π′)p′] + (1− λ′)ζθ′ ∈ L(π
′p+ (1− π′)p′)
Since (α, π′τ + (1 − π′)τ ′) ∈ Φ(π′p + (1 − π′)p′), by another application of Lemma 5
we have that
(α, λ′[π′τ + (1− π′)τ ′] + (1− λ′)) =
(
α,
π(1− τ)τ + (1− π)(1− τ ′)τ ′ + (1− π)(τ ′ − τ)
1− τ
)
= (α, τ) ∈ Φ(πp + (1− π)q)
Hence a source line exists if and only if we can find q ∈ L(p′) such that (α, τ) ∈
Φ(πp+ (1− π)q) for every π. Note that given the interpretation of the odds ratio as
a relative weight between a pair of incomparable alternatives, if p and q share both
a utility and weight value in common, then they can be substituted for each other
with an odds ratio of 1, so that βp + (1 − β)r ≍ βq + (1 − β)r for every β and r.
This implies that on any plane containing both p and q we can find a set of parallel
incomparability curves.
For every δ ∈ R, let p + δ(p− p) define a vertical shift from p in the direction p− p.











p+ δ(p− p)− τζα+ δ
τ
1− τ
By Lemma 5, we have that (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p) if and only if (α + δ
τ
, τ) ∈ Φ(p + δ(p− p))
for every δ ∈ R. The following lemma shows that if there exists a set of parallel
incomparability curves connecting two such vertical lines defined this way, then any
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set of lotteries lying on such an incomparability curve shares a utility-weight pair in
common.
Lemma 9 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every p1, p2 ∈ C, p1 + δ(p − p) ≍
p2 + δ(p − p) for every δ ∈ R if and only if there is α ∈ [0, 1] and τ ≥ 0 such that












































Fig. 2.7: Common Utility and Weight Values Define a Source Line
This lemma shows that there is a common utility-weight pair (α, τ) ∈ Φ(pπ) for every
π if and only if for every δ there is a common utility value α + δ
τ
∈ A(pπ + δ(p− p))
for every π. As shown in Figure 2.7, this implies that there are a set of parallel
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incomparability curves connecting p1 + δ(p − p) to p2 + δ(p − p) for every δ ∈ R if
and only if there is a source line O that is itself parallel to the line connecting p1 and
p2 projecting the incomparability planes on which these curves lie, establishing that
pπ + δ(p− p) ≍ ζα+ δ
τ
for every π and δ. Note that here, a source line is defined only
by the intersection of incomparability planes through pπ + δ(p− p) for every δ ∈ R,
unlike in weighted utility with completeness where the intersection of only two such
planes was sufficient to define a source line. Observe that the line O′ is also parallel
to the line between p1 and p2 and hence represents another utility-weight pair (α, τ ′)
with τ ′ < τ . Since pπ ≍ ζα and p
π + δ(p− p) ≍ ζα+ δ
τ ′
, O′ does indeed project at least
a pair of incomparability planes, but since pπ − δ(p− p) ≻α− δ
τ ′
, it cannot be a source
line.
Therefore, we now have the condition that characterizes a source line O connecting
source points in S1 and S2. The following lemma shows the existence of such a line
for any p1, p2 ∈ C, and furthermore establishes that source points cannot be isolated,
so that for every o1 ∈ S1 there is some line O that connects it to some o2 ∈ S2. Thus
any utility-weight pair in V(p1) can be matched with some pair in V(p2), or otherwise
the representation of ≻ over C would conflict with that of its restriction to L(p1).
Lemma 10 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every p1, p2 ∈ C, then φ1 ∈ Φ(p1) if
and only if there is φ2 ∈ Φ(p2) such that πφ1 ⊕ (1 − π)φ2 ∈ Φ(πp1 + (1 − π)p2) for
every π ∈ R.
Lemma 10 shows that given p1, p2 ∈ C, for every φ1 = (α1, τ 1) ∈ Φ(p1) there exists
some q ∈ L(p2) such that φ1 ∈ Φ(πp1 + (1− π)q) for every π, thus defining a source








, we have that πφ1⊕ (1−π)φ2 ∈ Φ(πp1+(1−π)p2) for every π. We
can now extend this result to any finite number of dimensions by repeated application
of this result. For φi = (αi, τ i) and πi ∈ R for i = 1, . . . , n, let the weighted linear
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The following lemma shows that given any collection of elements {p1, . . . , pn} ∈ C,
there exists a collection of utility-weight pairs ψ = (φi, . . . , φn) that define a hyper-
plane on which every point is a source.
Lemma 11 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every {p1, . . . , pn} ∈ C, there is ψ =











The result of Lemma 11 directly prescribes the construction of a multiple weighted





















For every ψ = ((α1, τ 1), . . . , (αn, τn)) ∈ Ψ, we have that there are source points

























































By construction (Uψ(q),W ψ(q)) ∈ Φ(q) for every q ∈ C and as in the two-dimensional
case, we have Uψ(p) = 1, Uψ(p) = 0 and W ψ(p) = W ψ(p) = 1. Furthermore, it is
easily verified that (Uψ,W ψ) is weighted linear over C. Collect these functions in
V = {(Uψ,W ψ) : ψ ∈ Ψ}. We can now show that V represents ≻ over C, using
similar arguments as those employed in the two-dimensional model.
Lemma 12 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every p1, p2 ∈ C, p1 ≍ p2 if and only
if U(p1) = U(p2) for some (U,W ) ∈ V.
Lemma 13 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-5, then for every p1, p2 ∈ C, p1 ≻ p2 if and only
if U(p1) > U(p2) for every (U,W ) ∈ V.
The main representation theorem thus follows directly from Lemma 13.
Theorem 1 A preference relation ≻ over a convex subset C of a finite dimensional
linear space L is bounded and satisfies Axioms 1-5 if and only if there is a set V of
weighted linear pairs such that for every p, q ∈ C,
p ≻ q ⇔ U(p) > U(q) ∀ (U,W ) ∈ V
Proof of Theorem 1 The proof of necessity is self-evident. The proof of sufficiency
follows by constructing V as prescribed and applying Lemma 13. 
Corollary to Theorem 1 A preference relation≻ over ∆(X) is bounded and satisfies
Axioms 1-5 if and only if there is a set Ṽ of utility-weight pairs such that for every
p, q ∈ C,










∀ (u, w) ∈ Ṽ
Proof of Corollary For every weighted linear pair (U,W ) over ∆(X), let u(x) =
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The result follows immediately by applying Theorem 1 and letting Ṽ = {(u, w) :
(U,W ) ∈ V}. 
2.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have established that simultaneously relaxing completeness, as
in Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) [10] and Galaabaatar and Karni (2012) [13],
and weakening independence to the ratio substitution property of Chew and Mac-
Crimmon (1979) [7] yields preferences that have a representation by a set of weighted
linear utility functions. Notably, we showed that although obtaining the multi-utility
representation relied on applying the independence axiom, and the weighted utility
representation on completeness, we can build a general model that admits the results
of both without making any additional assumptions to impose structure.
Our model generates preferences that exhibit the characteristics of both the multi-
utility and weighted utility models while generating phenomena that do not arise
in either. In the two-dimensional triangle diagram of Machina (1982) [22], we have
multiple source points, each projecting a set of incomparability curves, so that a
lottery p is strictly preferred to an alternative q if and only if it lies above each
incomparability curve intersecting q. Hence the overall indifference map is given by
the superimposition of several weighted utility indifference maps. Extended to any
mixture space of finite dimension, we have a set of source hyperplanes from which
originate sets of incomparability planes that are not necessarily parallel, so that the
shapes of the upper and lower contour sets of any mixture may vary throughout.
66
In the final chapter, we will provide some intuition to complement the technical results
of this chapter. In particular, we will investigate the special cases where a decision
maker’s set of criteria are given either by a set of utility functions paired with a
single weight functions, or a single utility function and multiple weight functions, and
consider the patterns of behavior that arise in either instance. Notably, we show that
although these cases may appear to be indistinguishable from each other, they have
dramatically different consequences on the relationship between risk and indecision.
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3. INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES WITH CONFLICTING
TASTES AND PERCEPTIONS
3.1 Motivation
In the preceding chapter, we showed that preferences that are neither negatively
transitive, and hence complete, nor satisfy independence, but only a weaker ratio
substitution property, have a utility representation that exhibits both multiplicity
and non-linearity, consisting of a set of weighted linear utility functions all of which
must agree on a ranking of two alternatives in order for the decision maker to show a
strict preference. That is, if ∆(X) is the set of probability distributions over a finite
outcome set X representing all the lotteries over these prizes, we have that there is a
set Ṽ consisting of pairs of utility u : X 7→ R and weight w : X 7→ R+ functions such
that for every p, q ∈ ∆(X), we have










∀ (u, w) ∈ Ṽ
This model thus combines the multi-utility models of Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok
(2004) [10] and Galaabaatar and Karni (2012) [13] with the weighted utility model
of Chew and MacCrimmon (1979) [7] into a single setup that can admit all the con-
clusions of either. However, the range of phenomena encompassed by this framework
is not restricted merely to behavior that can already be explained by existing models
that relax either completeness or independence alone. This chapter will focus on some
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special cases of the multiple weighted utility model that illustrate the types of atti-
tudes that decision makers whose preferences are given by such a representation may
have, especially with regard to how the tastes and perceptions that the various utility
functions exhibit will shift in relation to one another, and the consequences this has
to the degree of incompleteness, a notion which has been repeatedly referenced in the
preceding chapters but has yet to be fully explored in detail.
Each (u, w) ∈ Ṽ can be thought of as representing some set of priorities for the
decision maker. In the lucky event that they all indicate a particular lottery p should
be ranked higher than an alternative q, then she is able to decisively pick p in the
knowledge that no aspect of her internal thought process would have rather chosen
q instead. Whenever any of these disagree on a ranking, however, then she considers
the alternatives to be incomparable, so picking either one or the other would leave
her dissatisfied in some way, a circumstances which in all likelihood describes the
vast majority of choices that people must make in reality, no matter what kind of
qualities our idealized self-images might possess. Furthermore, each of the criteria
evaluates lotteries as a weighted expected value, with the weight assigning a level of
importance w(x) to every outcome, separate from the utility value u(x). The weight
function can thus be interpreted as a distortion function that gives the decision maker
a skewed perception of risk, transforming the objective probabilities p ∈ ∆(X) to some





This transformation will shift the perception of p so that the more highly weighted
outcomes will appear more likely to be received than they are, regardless of whether
such prizes are actually deemed desirable or not. For example, the Allais paradox
might be explained if the decision maker attaches greater weight to the extreme
69
outcomes of $5m and $0 than to the median outcome of $1m, so that whatever the
utility function indicates about her actual tastes, her actual degree of risk aversion
will vary. Since any mixture of $1m and $0 is evaluated as if it gives a non-zero
payoff with lower probability than it actually does, the decision maker will appear
more willing to take on additional risk than her utility function over outcomes would
indicate, readily exchanging the chance of receiving $1m for a lower probability of
winning $5m at a ratio that would be unacceptable if the $1m payoff were received
with certainty. Likewise, mixtures of $1m and $5m are perceived as yielding $5m with
higher probability than they actually do, making the decision maker appear more risk
averse.
Under incompleteness, the decision maker may have multiple weight functions, each
representing a distinct transformation of the space of lotteries, and therefore may be
unsure of her perception of risk, much like in Maccheroni (2004) [20], except that here
the utility function representing her tastes need not be linear in either the payoffs or
the probabilities, nor unique for that matter so that in addition to incomplete percep-
tion she may also exhibit incomplete tastes as in Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004)
[10] and Galaabaatar and Karni [13]. Moreover, within the space of decision criteria
Ṽ, there may be several utility functions paired with a single weight function, several
weight functions paired with a single utility, or both simultaneously, potentially in
a manner that such that the sets of utilities and weights cannot be separated from
each other so that Ṽ = Ũ × W̃ . Therefore, indecision may arise from conflicts in
tastes, perceptions, or both, and as we will show, within this framework the decision
criteria may fall in and out of agreement with one another when evaluating different




To illustrate the possibilities, we consider once again constructing a triangle diagram




(α, τ) : βp+ (1− β)r ≍
βτζα + (1− β)r
βτ + (1− β)
∀ β ∈ (0, 1), r ∈ C
}
Thus (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p) if and only if p ≍ ζα and τ ≥ 0 satisfies ratio substitution between
them, so that a set of incomparability curves is projected from the source point
o = p−τζα
1−τ
. Further recall that the location of any source point can be determined
by drawing a similar triangle with vertices p, o = p−τp
1−τ




o = αo+(1−α)o so that the source lies in the same position on the opposite edge as
ζα = αp+ (1− α)p does on the best-worst edge. Hence the utility-weight pair (α, τ)
defines a coordinate system for the set of source points.
Figure 3.1 depicts the triangle diagram with incomparability curves projected from




for i = 1, 2, 3. Each pair (αi, τ i) defines utility and
weight functions (U i,W i) over L(p) such that for every q = λp+ (1− λ)ζθ ∈ L(p) we
have that
U i(q) =
λτ iαi + (1− λ)θ
λτ i + (1− λ)
W i(q) = λτ i + (1− λ)
Since we have that q = W i(q)ζU i(q) + (1−W
i(q))oi for every q, the utility is defined
by drawing a line from oi through q to intersect the best-worst line, and the weight
given by the position of q along this line. First observe that since τ 1 = τ 2, the source
points o1 and o2 lie on the same vertical line parallel to p− p and therefore generate



















Fig. 3.1: Triangle Diagram with Three Source Points
have U2(q) > U1(q) for every q and hence the incomparability curves originating from
o2 are steeper everywhere than those originating o1, and consequently never coincide
with one another. This implies that U2 is comparatively more risk averse than U1 and
hence will always demand greater “compensation” for taking on additional risk in the
sense of requiring a better chance of winning the best prize in order to be willing to
gamble. Intuitively, two source points lying on the same vertical line indicate decision
criteria that differ only in tastes and not perception, and therefore will never exactly
agree on how to evaluate any particular lottery.
Now observe that α1 = α3, so that o1 and o3 both lie on the line connecting p to
ζα1 = ζα3 and therefore assign the same utility to this lottery U
1(p) = U3(p), but not
necessarily to every other lottery in the simplex. Even though both criteria assign
equal value to p, since τ 1 < τ 3 < 1 the incomparability curves originating from o1 fan
out more than those from o3, reflecting that the former represent a more distorted
weight scheme from the objective probabilities than the latter, thus deviating more
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from the independence axiom and exhibiting more extreme Allais-type behavior. As
both share identical tastes however, they assign equal value to p itself and thus the
incomparability curves through p originating from o1 and o3 exactly coincide, dividing
the simplex in two such that U1 is more risk averse than U3 on the upper half and
less risk averse on the lower half. Fixing some β and letting q = βp + (1 − β)p
and q = βp + (1 − β)p, we see that U1(q) > U3(q), but U1(q) < U3(q). Because
W 1(p) < W 3(p), U1 sees q as being more similar to p than does U3 and hence better,
















Fig. 3.2: Alternative Triangle Diagram with Three Source Points
Finally, consider the last possible pairing of source points o2 and o3, and note that
since α2 > α3 but τ 2 < τ 3, these represent both different tastes and different per-
ceptions. Observe however that this is not fundamentally different from the case
where only perception varies, as we have U2(q) = U3(q) and thus the coinciding in-
comparability curves through q once again divide the simplex in two, with the lines
originating from o2 being steeper above and those from o3 steeper below. Intuitively
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when evaluating q, U2 considers the component of p in this mixture to be more valu-
able than does U3, but also assigns it less weight relative to the p component, so
that for this particular lottery these competing effects exactly cancel each other out.
As shown in Figure 3.2, we may define the simplex relative to q rather than p, and
since L(q) = L(p) we can draw the same incomparability curves but with a different
interpretation of how the various source points relate to one another. Here we have
instead that o2 and o3 agree on taste but not perception of q, while o1 and o3 dis-
agree on both, though the incomparability curves they project still coincide at any
r = γp+ (1− γ)ζα1 and thus still divide the simplex in two as before. Note however
that the relationship between o1 and o2 has not changed, as the weight functions W 1
and W 2 were identical everywhere and continue to be so here, so that U1 and U2
remain in conflict only in their relative attitude toward risk and not their perception
of it.
This of course is quite an elementary result that simply draws on the definition of
parallelism, as whenever the line between any two source points is not parallel to the
line connecting p and p, it can be extended to intersect it at some ζα, such that any
lottery on this line is assigned the same utility α. Nevertheless, the case in which the
set of source points on any given plane L(p) does consist only of a line parallel to p−p
appears to be worth investigating and, as we will show, represents manifestations of
incompleteness arising only from differences in tastes and not perception.
3.3 Incomplete Tastes Model
In the preceding section, we saw that a pair of source points o1, o2 generate identical
weight functions whenever o1 − o2 is parallel to p− p. A simple strengthening to the
weak substitution axiom provides the necessary and sufficient condition for all pairs
of source points to obey this property.
74
Axiom 6 (Parallel Substitution) For every p, q ∈ C, p ≍ q if and only if for every
β ∈ (0, 1) there is a unique γ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every r ∈ ∆(X), βp+ (1− β)r ≍
γq + (1− γ)r.
Axiom 6 therefore ensures that given any two incomparable pairs p ≍ q, there exists
a unique odds ratio τ = γ/(1−γ)
β/(1−β)
that maintains this incomparability under mixture
with a third alternative r. This effectively restricts the source space on any plane
L(p) to consist only of a vertical line, so that incompleteness is restricted only to the
utility levels.
Lemma 14 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-4,6 then for every p ∈ ∆(X), there is τ ≥ 0 such
that Φ(p) = {(α, τ) : α ∈ A(p)}.
Now consider the restriction of ≻ to some plane L(p) for any p ∈ C. Let τ(p) denote
the unique weight, and recall that by Lemma 4 the set of utility values is given by
a closed interval A(p) = [α(p), α(p)], so that by Lemma 14, Φ(p) = [α(p), α(p)] ×
{τ(p)}. A useful result here is that, just as in multi-utility with independence, the
restriction of ≻ to L(p) has a parsimonious representation by the pair of utility
functions indicating the highest and lowest levels of risk aversion, corresponding to
α(p) and α(p), respectively. For every q = λp+ (1− λ)ζθ ∈ L(p), define
U(q) =
λτ(p)α(p) + (1− λ)θ
λτ(p) + (1− λ)
U(q) =
λτ(p)α(p) + (1− λ)θ
λτ(p) + (1− λ)
W (q) = λτ(p) + (1− λ)
By construction, both (U,W ) and (U,W ) are elements of the full set of decision
criteria V(p) = {(Uφ,W φ) : φ ∈ Φ(p)}, and it is easily verified that both are weighted
linear as well. The following lemma shows that ≻ has a representation over L(p)
simply by considering these two pairs rather than the entirety of V(p)
Lemma 15 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-4,6 then for every q1, q2 ∈ L(p), q1 ≻ q2 if and
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only if U(q1) > U(q2) and U(q1) > U(q2).
Now consider p1, p2 ∈ C such that p2 /∈ L(p1). Recall that in the general model, we
took great care to emphasize that source points across planes could not simply be
connected arbitrarily, so that φi ∈ Φ(pi) for i = 1, 2 did not necessarily imply that
we necessarily have πφ1 ⊕ (1− π)φ2 ∈ Φ(πp1 + (1− π)p2). Under the assumption of
parallel substitution however, we at least have the result that the unique weight τ(·) is
a linear function, implying that the space of source points lies on a hyperplane parallel
to p− p, and that the upper and lower envelopes of the source space represented by
α(·) and α(·) are weighted convex and concave, respectively.
Lemma 16 If ≻ satisfies Axioms 1-4,6, then for every p1, p2 ∈ C and π ∈ [0, 1] we
have that
τ(πp1 + (1− π)p2) = πτ(p1) + (1− π)τ(p2)
α(πp1 + (1− π)p2) ≤
πτ(p1)α(p1) + (1− π)τ(p2)α(p2)
πτ(p1) + (1− π)τ(p2)
α(πp1 + (1− π)p2) ≥
πτ(p1)α(p1) + (1− π)τ(p2)α(p2)
πτ(p1) + (1− π)τ(p2)
As shown in Figure 3.3 shows, for i = 1, 2 the restriction of ≻ to each L(pi) has a
parsimonious representation by two utility weight pairs (αi, τ i) and (αi, τ i), as the
incomparability curves projected by any other pair (α, τ i) for a utility α ∈ (αi, αi)
would always lie between the curves corresponding to the extreme values. As each
lottery has only a single weight value, the source space for any pπ = πp1 + (1− π)p2
must be a vertical line, and as the weight function is linear, the entire source space
must lie on some plane parallel to p − p. Furthermore, the utility range for each pπ




and α∗ = πτ
1α1+(1−π)τ2α2
πτ1+(1−π)τ2
, which ensures that upper and lower




























Fig. 3.3: Incomplete Tastes
incomparability plane projected by any valid source line O. Note that in general, the
preference relation ≻ over C does not have a parsimonious representation by a pair of
utilities, one of which is everywhere more risk averse than the other, unless all of the
conditions in Lemma 16 are satisfied at equality. In this case, setting U(p) = α(p),
U(p) = α(p), and W (p) = τ(p) would yield weighted linear pairs and the upper and
lower contour sets would be wedge-shaped.
Figure 3.4 also shows how under parallel substitution, the degree of indecision that
the decision maker exhibits must in some sense decrease under mixture. For every
p ∈ C, let U(p) denote the set of local utility functions, defined as the dual of the
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Fig. 3.4: Incompleteness Mitigated By Mixture
values pπ may take is restricted by the utility ranges for p1 and p2, we see that the
decision maker can be no more unsure her evaluation of the mixture than she is of its
components, and indeed in this example is considerably more capable of determining
her affinity for pπ than of either p1 or p2. Intuitively, the maximal utility range is
obtained whenever α(p) and α(p) are themselves weighted linear, which implies that
the decision maker has only two criteria (U,W ) and (U,W ) that differ only in risk
attitude, so that U uniformly assigns a higher value to every possible lottery than
does U , and do not conflict in their perception. Therefore, any utility value that the
decision maker may attach to pπ can be no worse than the value obtained by taking
the weighted expectation of the worst possible value for each its components, and no
better than the weighted expectation of the best component values.
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When the conditions of Lemma 16 are satisfied with strict inequality, the decision cri-
teria vary not only in their attitude toward risk but also how they rank the components
p1 and p2 relative to each other. This allows disagreements between to potentially
cancel each other out when lotteries are mixed together, which we observe whenever
the source lines corresponding to two distinct criteria intersect, exactly agreeing on a
utility value for some pπ. Therefore, individuals may actually be decisive when evalu-
ating mixtures than they are of the individual components. For example, a car buyer
may be unsure of how much she is willing to pay for a red sports car and equally un-
sure of how to value the same car painted blue, as perhaps she has peculiar neuroses
regarding how the color of her vehicle affects her social status. By instead considering
a lottery that gives either color with equal probability, she can simply evaluate the car
on its actual performance characteristics and eliminate all paint-induced indecision.





















Note that as the source lines may be infinitely extended by betweenness, the πi may
indeed take on negative values, which has relevance if the basis consists of elements in
the interior of C. Recall that by Theorem 1, we obtain a multiple weighted expected
utility representation by defining for every ψ = {(αi, τ i)}ni=1 a utility and weight
functions such that Uψ(pi) = αi and W ψ(pi) = τ i for i = 1, . . . , n and letting V =
{(Uψ,W ψ) : ψ ∈ Ψ}. Since further imposing the parallel substitution condition
ensures that each lottery has a unique weight value, the representation theorem for
the case where incompleteness is restricted only to tastes follows directly.
Theorem 2 A preference relation ≻ over a convex subset C of a finite dimensional
linear space L is bounded and satisfies Axioms 1-4,6 if and only if there is a set U of
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utility functions and a weight function W such that (U,W ) is a weighted linear pair
for every U ∈ U and for every p, q ∈ C,
p ≻ q ⇔ U(p) > U(q) ∀ U ∈ U
Proof of Theorem 2 Define W : C 7→ R+ such that W (p) = τ(p) for every p ∈ C.
Thus constructing V as prescribed we have by Lemma 14 that for every (Uψ,W ψ) ∈ V,
we have W ψ(p) = W (p) for every p ∈ C. Letting U = {Uψ : (Uψ,W ) ∈ V} and
applying Theorem 1 completes the proof. 
Corollary to Theorem 2 A preference relation≻ over ∆(X) is bounded and satisfies
Axioms 1-4,6 if and only if there is a set Ũ of utility functions and a weight function
w such that for every p, q ∈ C,










∀ u ∈ Ũ
Proof of Corollary Define the weight function w : X 7→ R+ such that w(x) =W (δx)











The result follows immediately by applying Theorem 2 and letting Ũ = {u : U ∈ U}.

Observing the form of the representation in the corollary also gives us an impetus
to establish a uniqueness result for this special case. Intuitively, a decision maker
with incomplete tastes but only a single distortion function skewing her perception
may alternatively be interpreted as simply applying a one-time transformation to the
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entire space of lotteries and subsequently adhering to the independence axiom with
respect to the perceived probabilities, effectively ranking the transformed lotteries by
a set of linear utilities, for which uniqueness results have been established in Dubra,
Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) [10] and Galaabaatar and Karni (2012) [13]. For every
p =
∑
x∈X p(x)δx ∈ ∆(X), denote the transformed lottery p














Define the transformed preference relation ≻w over C such that p ≻ q if and only if
pw ≻w qw, and the corresponding transformed weak preference %w, indifference ∼w,
and incomparability ≍w relations using the given definitions taking ≻w as a primitive.
By the corollary to Theorem 2, we have that






qw(x)u(x) ∀ u ∈ Ũ
Therefore, ≻w satisfies the independence axiom so that we are free to adapt estab-
lished uniqueness results from multi-utility models here. Let 〈Ũ〉 denote the closure
of the convex cone generated by the elements of Ũ and a constant function on L.
The following theorem establishes the result that the set of utilities is unique to
corresponding closed convex cone it generates.
Theorem 3 If a preference relation ≻ over ∆(X) satisfies Axioms 1-4,6 and there
are sets of utilities Ũ i and weight functions wi : X 7→ R+ such that for i = 1, 2,














∀ ui ∈ Ũ i
Then 〈Ũ1〉 = 〈Ũ2〉 and there is k ∈ R such that w2(x) = kw1(x) for every x ∈ X .
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Note that the uniqueness result only applies in the case of incomplete tastes, and
not in the general case where perceptions may differ as well, as there is no easily
defined analogue of the closed cone operation that can be applied to a set of decision
criteria V that assigns multiple utility and weight values to each outcome. Suppose
we have (U1,W 1) and (U2,W 2) and we wish to consider the analogue of the convex
combination of these decision criteria. Consider defining for κ ∈ [0, 1] some weighted
convex combination (Uκ,W κ). In order to preserve the linearity of the weight function
we must set
W κ(p) = κW 1(p) + (1− κ)W 2(p)
Then in order to maintain the weighted linearity of the utility function, we should
have
Uκ(p) =
κW 1(p)U1(p) + (1− κ)W 2(p)U2(p)
κW 1(p) + (1− κ)W 2(p)
However, a quick example shows that appending (Uκ,W κ) to V may in fact alter the
preferences. Suppose that for p, q ∈ C, and κ = 1
2
, we have the values

























Thus U1(p) > U1(q) and U2(p) > U2(q), so that we should have p ≻ q, but that
Uκ(p) < Uκ(q), so that the apparently harmless addition of (Uκ,W κ) to the set of
criteria would alter this strict preference to incomparability. As shown in Figure 3.5,
this arises since the source lines O1 and O2 do not lie on the same plane, whereas in
the special case of incomplete tastes they must necessarily be so. Note that as this
is a representation of a three-dimensional diagram, the source lines do not actually





























Fig. 3.5: Confounding of General Uniqueness Result
odd sort of twist as κ is varied, with the result that the weighted convex combination
(Uκ,W κ) may contradict its component decision criteria.
This curious situation could be considered a case of Simpson’s paradox, where the
success rate of a particular treatment may be higher than an alternative treatment
within two sub-samples, but lower across the aggregated sample. In this context,
the decision criteria represent the sub-samples, and the lotteries the treatments. For
example suppose that a couple, with (U1,W 1) representing the wife and (U2,W 2)
the husband, is deciding between buying a sports car p or a minivan q. Note that
even though the wife would just as quickly as her husband abandon their children to
satisfy a mid-life crisis, she assigns greater value to both choices while weighting the
worse one more heavily, so that when the two attempt to reach a wholly unnecessary
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compromise, the resulting combination (Uκ,W κ) would actually prescribe the oppo-
site course of action from the one they had initially agreed upon. Despite this issue,
we do expect that some form of uniqueness result does exist for the general model,
and it is left as an open topic for future work.
3.4 Incomplete Perception Model
We now consider another special case, where incompleteness is restricted not to tastes
but to perceptions, and is thus reflected by multiplicity in the weight, rather than
the utility function. Recall that while the incomplete taste model was able to ensure
that every lottery had a unique weight value, in this model we can only ensure a
unique utility value along a line where the incomparability curves coincide to define
an indifference curve. As shown before, when considering a general mixture space
C any two source points that do not lie on a line parallel to p − p define such an
indifference curve, so we will restrict our attention to spaces of lotteries over prizes
∆(X). To obtain the desired representation, we impose the additional assumption
that any degenerate outcome should be indifferent to some mixture of the best and
worst outcomes.
Axiom 7 (Degenerate Solvability) For every x ∈ X , there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that
δx ∼ ζα.
The effect of making this assumption is clear, since if δx ∼ ζα then it must be that for
any α′ 6= α we must have either δx ≻ ζα′ or δx ≺ ζα′. This implies that A(δx) = {α}
and therefore that Φ(δx) = {(α, τ) : τ ∈ T (δx, ζα)}, defining a set of source points
that all lie on the extension of the line connecting δx to ζα. Note that unlike under
incomplete tastes, this does not ensure that every lottery p ∈ ∆(X) has some mixture
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Fig. 3.6: Incomplete Perception
As shown in Figure 3.6, for i = 1, 2, we have δxi ∼ ζαi so that these pairs of lotteries




i ], so that there
are a range of odds ratios satisfying substitution between them. Note however that
since α2 > α1, these indifference curves do not lie on the same plane, and therefore
for some p = πδx1 + (1 − π)δx2 , the four possible source lines connecting source
points on L(δx1) and L(δx2) yield four distinct source points on L(p) at three distinct
utility values and three separate weights. Note that any pair of such points, except
the two corresponding to the same weight value τ 3p , project incomparability curves
that overlap somewhere on L(p). However, since the source points corresponding
to the pairs (α1p, τ
3




p ) lie on a line parallel to the best-worst line, the
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incomparability curves they project never coincide as those originating from the latter
are everywhere steeper than those originating from the former. Hence there are no
indifference curves on L(p) so that no lottery lying on this plane has a unique utility
value.
Consequently, with incomplete perception the degree of incompleteness is actually
exacerbated by mixture, as there is a unique local utility function, given as before
by the dual cone of the upper contour set, at both δx1 and δx2, but a range of such
functions at p. Note that the decision maker obtains the higher value α2p for p under
the scheme that weights the better outcome x2 more heavily, thus perceiving p to
be more similar to it than to x1, the lower value α
1
p that weights x1 more, and a
median value α3p under any transformation that gives these prizes equal significance.
This suggests that the the inability to rank lotteries originates not from a failure to
evaluate the outcomes properly, but from not knowing which of the potential prizes
to pay more attention to. For example, a decision maker may fully understand how
much she likes either a full glass of water or an empty one, but be unsure whether to
perceive an equal mixture of the two as being half-full or half-empty, yielding a range
of values reflecting varying degrees of optimism or pessimism.
The representation theorem for the incomplete perception case follows by once again
constructing Ψ and noting that if δx ∼ ζα, then for every ψ ∈ Ψ the utility-weight
pair (Uψ,W ψ) must set Uψ(δx) = α. Note however that Axiom 7 can only ensure that
there is a unique utility function over outcomes, if there was additionally a unique
utility over lotteries, then preferences must be complete so that just as in Chew and
MacCrimmon (1979) [7], the weight functions over both outcomes and lotteries would
be unique as well.
Theorem 4 A preference relation ≻ over ∆(X) is bounded and satisfies Axioms 1-5,7
if and only if there is a utility function u and a set W̃ of weight functions and such
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that for every p, q ∈ ∆(X),










∀ w ∈ W̃
Proof of Theorem 4 Define u : X 7→ R such that δx ∼ δu(x) for every x ∈ X , then
constructing V as prescribed we have for every (Uψ,W ψ) ∈ V that Uψ(δx) = u(x).
Defining wψ(x) = W ψ(δx) for every ψ ∈ Ψ and letting W̃ = {w
ψ : (Uψ,W ψ) ∈ V}
and applying Theorem 1 completes the proof. 
Just as in the general model, a uniqueness proof for the incomplete perception case has
so far proven elusive. If we were to construct some sort of convex cone generated by
W̃ , then any combination within must itself be a linear function as the entire concept
of weighted utility relies on the weight functions themselves being linear, though the
value function is not itself linear in the weights. Recall that the uniqueness result
in the incomplete tastes case was possible because Axiom 6 ensured that all of the
source points lay on a single hyperplane, so that we could take convex combinations
of the utility functions while staying on the same hyperplane. In order to have the
same type of property here, all of the source points would need to lie on a single
indifference hyperplane, which would in turn require that there exist some α such
that δx ∼ ζα for every x ∈ X , so that the utility function would be constant making
the weight function entirely irrelevant. In the model of Maccheroni (2004) [20] that
relaxed the completeness axiom within the dual theory of Yaari (1987) [25], the set
of probability distortions was unique up to its closed and convex hull, though the
utility was linear in payoffs in his case. It remains to be seen whether imposing some
additional assumptions in this context will lead to a similar result.
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3.5 Conclusion
We have considered special cases of the multiple weighted expected utility model
where the conflict among the decision maker’s various criteria are restricted to either
tastes or perception alone. If the perception of risk is distorted only by a single
weight function, then just as under independence, the restriction of preferences to
a two-dimensional space L(p) has a parsimonious representation by a pair of utility
functions reflecting the extremes of the possible risk attitudes, although here Allais-
type behavior is still observed whenever perception strays from the objective reality.
Over the entire space however, the utility functions represent not only the degree of
risk aversion but also the relative ranking of the various outcomes, so that indecision
is mitigated by mixture as it is entirely generated by an inability to rank outcomes.
Thus the level of disagreement reaches its maximal extent when evaluating certain
prizes and is no worse when considering lotteries instead. On the other hand, if the
decision maker has fixed tastes but conflicting perceptions of risk, then indecision is
exacerbated by mixture, as she can assign a single utility value to every component
outcome of a lottery, but her inability to decide on a single transformation function
results in disagreement on how to evaluate the lottery as a whole. In general, we
should expect that multiplicity in both tastes and perception contribute to overall
indecisiveness, such that the overall effect when considering mixtures is unclear and
dependent on the exact structure of the representation.
Although the results obtained throughout the course of this analysis by no means
represent a perfect model of decision making under risk, they represent a step toward
building a broader understanding rather than considering each deviation from the
norm as a separate problem requiring a specialized model incompatible with previous
work. In the future, it may be worthwhile to establish a firmer uniqueness result, as
well as consider relaxing the assumptions further, especially removing the structure
88
imposed by the weak substitution axiom to obtain a general multiple non-expected
utility model with a set of arbitrary decision criteria. Extending the framework to
admit Knightian uncertainty in addition to measurable risk may also prove insightful,
particularly because tastes will then be paired with subjective beliefs, which have a far
more attractive interpretation than fundamentally incorrect perceptions of objective
probabilities. Finally, we might wish to consider various decision rules that might
be applied to resolve incompleteness whenever a decision maker is forced to choose
between incomparable alternatives, and investigate the erratic patterns of behavior
sure to result. Indeed, it would not be entirely erroneous to assert that human beings
are never able to act without some degree of hesitation or indecisiveness, and that
every choice we make would be considered the incorrect one by some facet of our
personality that in another setting would be the deciding factor driving our actions.
Framing effects are especially worthy of focus, as there is a degree of duality between
lotteries and decision criteria, and if we are to apply weighting schemes to consider
mixtures of the former, the same might well apply to the latter instead. While
the inherent nature of incomplete preferences makes it quite a difficult subject to
study that requires imposing structure on aspects of human behavior that are by
definition not fully understood, the very ubiquity of hesitation and vacillation makes




Proof of Lemma 1 Fix p, q, r ∈ C. For every α∗ ∈ {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp + (1 − α)q ≻ r}
we have by the Archimedean axiom that there are β1, β2 ∈ [0, 1] such that (α
∗+ǫ1)p+
(1− α∗ − ǫ1)q ≡ β1(α
∗p+ (1− α∗)q) + (1− β1)p ≻ r and (α
∗ − ǫ2)p+ (1− α
∗ + ǫ2) ≡
β2(α
∗p+(1−α∗)q)+(1−β2)q ≻ r. Picking some ǫ < min{ǫ1, ǫ2} we have by mixture
dominance that Nǫ(α
∗) ⊂ (α∗ − ǫ2, α
∗ + ǫ1) ⊆ {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+ (1− α)q ≻ r}. Hence
{α ∈ [0, 1] : αp + (1 − α)q ≻ r} is open and by a similar argument {α ∈ [0, 1] :
αp + (1 − α)q ≺ r} is open as well. Moreover {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp + (1 − α)q ≍ r} =
[0, 1] \ ({α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+ (1− α)q ≻ r} ∪ {α ∈ [0, 1] : αp+ (1− α)q ≺ r}) is closed.
Proof of Lemma 2 Fix p, q ∈ C and α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α > β and let γ = β
α
.
If p ≻ q, then by two applications of betweenness we have that p ≻ αp+ (1− α)q ≻
γ(αp+(1−α)q)+(1−γ)q = βp+(1−β)q ≻ q. If p ≍ q, then by the above argument
αp + (1 − α)q ≻ βp + (1 − β)q implies p ≻ q, and αp + (1 − α)q ≺ βp + (1 − β)q
implies p ≺ q, and hence we must have αp+ (1− α)q ≍ βp+ (1− β)q. 
Proof of Lemma 3 Fix p, q ∈ C such that p ≍ q. Fix r ∈ C and pick β, γ ∈ (0, 1)
that satisfy weak substitution so that s ≡ βp + (1 − β)r ≍ γq + (1 − γ)r ≡ t. Now





, proving the proposition requires
showing that u ≡ β ′p+ (1− β)′r ≍ γ′q + (1− γ′)r ≡ v.












Fig. A.1: Applying Desargues’ Theorem to Find the Source
source point lying outside of the simplex on the extended line pq, located at o = p−τq
1−τ
.
Draw parallel lines from s and r such that the line from s intersects uv at some
point s′, and extending ps′ intersects the line from r at some r′, and let t′ denote
the intersection of uv and qr′. By Desargues’ theorem, the triangles rst and r′s′t′
are perspective from the line opq, and hence the lines rr′, ss′, and tt′ are parallel.
This implies that s′ = βp + (1 − β)r′ and t′ = γq + (1 − γ)r′, and hence by weak
substitution that s′ ≍ t′. Since both s′ and t′ lie on uv, we have by betweenness that
u ≍ v as well, completing the proof. 
Proof of Lemma 4 Fix p, q, r ∈ C and define α = inf{α ∈ [0, 1] : r ≺ αp+(1−α)q}
and α = sup{α ∈ [0, 1] : r ≻ αp + (1 − α)q}. By Lemma 2, α > α implies p ≺
αp + (1 − α)q and α < α implies p ≻ αp + (1 − α)q, so that Axiom 1 implies
that α ≤ α, and furthermore that α /∈ [α, α] implies ¬(p ≍ ζα). By Lemma 1,
{α ∈ [0, 1] : r ≺ αp+ (1− α)q} and {α ∈ [0, 1] : r ≻ αp+ (1− α)q} are open, so that
α ≥ α implies ¬(r ≻ αp+ (1− α)q) and α ≤ α implies ¬(r ≺ αp+ (1− α)q). Hence
α ∈ [α, α] implies r ≍ αp+ (1− α)q. 
Proof of Lemma 5 Fix p ∈ C and pick any (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p). For every q = λp + (1 −
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λ)ζθ ∈ L(p), we have by ratio substitution that for every β ∈ (0, 1) and r ∈ C,
βq + (1− β)r = βλp+ β(1− λ)ζθ + (1− β)r ≍
βλτζα + β(1− λ)ζθ + (1− β)r
βλτ + β(1− λ) + (1− β)
≍
β(λτ + (1− λ))ζλτα+(1−λ)θ
λτ+(1−λ)
+ (1− β)r
β(λτ + (1− λ)) + (1− β)
≡
βτ ′ζα′ + (1− β)r
βτ ′ + (1− β)




, λτ + (1− λ)
)




λp+ (1− λ)ζθ − λτζα − (1− λ)ζθ
λ(1− τ)
=
q − τ ′ζα′
1− τ ′








Proof of Lemma 6 Fix q1, q2 ∈ L(p). First suppose that q1 ≍ q2 and let q2 =
λq1 + (1 − λ)ζθ. By betweenness, this implies that q
1 ≍ ζθ and thus for some τ ≥ 0
we have (θ, τ) ∈ Φ(q1). Therefore by Lemma 5, there is (U,W ) ∈ V(p) such that
U(q1) = θ. Since U(ζθ) = θ, and (U,W ) weighted linear by construction, this implies
that U(q2) = U(q1). Now suppose that there is (U,W ) ∈ V(p) such that U(q1) =
U(q2) = α′ for some α′ ∈ (0, 1). Let W (qi) = τ i for i = 1, 2, then by construction we




q1 − τ 1ζα′
1− τ 1
=






τ 2 − τ 1
1− τ 1
ζα′
Since (α′, τ i) ∈ Φ(qi) for i = 1, 2, q1 ≍ ζα′ and thus by betweenness, q
1 ≍ q2. 
Proof of Lemma 7 Fix q1, q2 ∈ L(p). If q1 ≻ q2 then by Lemma 6 there is no
(U,W ) ∈ V(p) such that U(q1) = U(q2). Suppose that for some (U,W ) ∈ V(p) we
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have that U(q1) < U(q2), then letting τ 1 = W (q1) there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that
U(q2) =
βW (q1)U(q1) + (1− β)W (p)U(p)
βW (q1) + (1− β)W (p)
= U(βq1 + (1− β)p)
This implies that q2 ≍ βq1 + (1 − β)p by Lemma 6, which contradicts mixture
dominance. Hence U(q1) > U(q2) for every (U,W ) ∈ V(p). Now suppose that
U(q1) > U(q2) for every (U,W ) ∈ V(p), this implies ¬(q1 ≍ q2) by Lemma 6 and
¬(q1 ≺ q2) by the previous argument. Therefore, we must have that q1 ≻ q2. 




π) such that α ∈ A∗ if and only if pπ ≍ ζα for every π ∈ R. Suppose
p1 ≍ p2, then if A∗ = ∅ there are π1, π2 ∈ R and α′ ∈ [0, 1] such that α(pπ
1
) > α′ >
α(pπ
2
) and hence pπ
1
≻ ζα′ ≻ p
π2. By mixture monotonicity, π1 > π2 implies p1 ≻ p2,
and π1 < π2 implies p1 ≺ p2, neither of which is permissible, and hence A∗ 6= ∅.
Now suppose ¬(p1 ≍ p2) and assume without loss of generality that p1 ≻ p2. For
every α ∈ [0, 1], we have that by mixture monotonicity that pπ ≻ ζα for π sufficiently
large, and hence α /∈ A(pπ) ⊆ A∗, which implies A∗ = ∅. Hence p ≍ q if and only if
A∗ 6= ∅. 









) = ∅. This implies that for some δ ∈ R we have without loss
of generality that there is α′ ∈ [0, 1] and τ ′ ≥ 0 such that α(pπ
1





+ δ(p− p)). This implies that pπ
1




+ δ(p− p), so that
π1 > π2 implies p1 + δ(p − p) ≻ p2 + δ(p − p) and π1 < π2 implies p1 + δ(p − p) ≺
p2 + δ(p− p).
Now suppose that Φ∗ 6= ∅, then for every (α, τ) ∈ Φ∗ we have by Lemma 5 that for
every δ ∈ R, pπ + δ(p − p) ≍ α + δ
τ
for every π ∈ R. This implies by Lemma 8 that
p1 + δ(p− p) ≍ p2 + δ(p− p) for every δ ∈ R. We conclude that Φ 6= ∅ if and only if
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p1 + δ(p− p) ≍ p2 + δ(p− p) for every δ ∈ R. 
Proof of Lemma 10 Fix p1, p2 ∈ C and pick any φ1 = (α1, τ 1) ∈ Φ(p1). Let
Q = {q ∈ L(p2) : p1 + δ(p− p) ≍ q + δ(p− p) ∀ δ ∈ R} and let qπ = πp1 + (1 − π)q




Suppose that there is no q ∈ Q such that φ1 ∈ Φ∗q , then there is π, δ ∈ R such that
either qπ + δ(p − p) ≻ ζα1+ δ
τ1
for every q ∈ Q or qπ + δ(p − p) ≺ ζα1+ δ
τ1
for every
q ∈ Q. If the former, then for some ǫ > 0 and q ∈ Q we have p1 + δ(p − p) ≻
qπ + (δ − ǫ)(p − p) ≻ ζα1+ δ
τ1
, and if the latter for some ǫ > 0 and q ∈ Q we have
p1+δ(p−p) ≺ qπ+(δ+ǫ)(p−p) ≺ ζα1+ δ
τ1
, either of which contradict (α1, τ 1) ∈ Φ(p1).
Thus there is q ∈ Q such that (α1, τ 1) ∈ Φ(qπ) for every π ∈ R.
Since q ∈ L(p2) there are λ, θ ∈ R such that p2 = λq + (1− λ)ζθ. Let φ




, λτ 1 + (1− λ)
)
. Then for every π ∈ R we have that
πp1 + (1− π)p2 = πp1 + (1− π)λq + (1− π)(1− λ)ζθ
= [π + (1− π)λ]
[
πp1 + (1− π)λq
π + (1− π)λ)
]
+ (1− π)(1− λ)ζθ





by construction so that by Lemma 5 we have
that φπ = (απ, τπ) ∈ Φ(πp1 + (1− π)p2) where
απ =
λπτ 1α1 + (1− λπ)θ
λπτ 1 + (1− λπ)
=
πτ 1α1 + (1− π)λτ 1α1 + (1− π)(1− λ)θ
πτ 1 + (1− π)λτ 1 + (1− π)(1− λ)
=





πτ 1 + (1− π)[λτ 1 + (1− λ)]
=
πτ 1α1 + (1− π)τ 2α2
πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2
τπ = λπτ 1 + (1− λπ) = πτ 1 + (1− π)(λτ 1 + (1− λ)) = πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2
Observing that φπ = πφ1 ⊕ (1− π)φ2 for every π ∈ R completes the proof. 
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Proof of Lemma 11 Fix {p1, . . . , pn} ∈ C and for m ≤ n define
Ψ(p1, . . . , pm) =
{

















We will show by induction that Ψ(p1, . . . , pm) 6= ∅ for every m ≤ n. For the base







i = 1}. Pick any (φ1, . . . , φm−1) ∈ Ψ(p1, . . . , pm−1), then
for every q =
∑m−1
i=1 π
ipi ∈ Q, we have that φq =
⊕m−1
i=1 π
iφi ∈ Φ(q). By Lemma 10,
this implies that there is φm ∈ Φ(pm) such that π∗φq⊕(1−π∗)φm ∈ Φ(π∗q+(1−π∗)pm)














i . The result above implies that
⊕m
i=1 π
iφi = π∗φq⊕(1−π∗)φm ∈ Φ(π∗q+
(1 − π)∗pm) = Φ(
∑m
i=1 π
ipi), and hence (φ1, . . . , φm) ∈ Ψ(p1, . . . , pm). Therefore
Ψ(p1, . . . , pm) 6= ∅ for every m ≤ n, and picking any ψ ∈ Ψ(p1, . . . , pn) completes the
proof. 
Proof of Lemma 12 Fix p1, p2 ∈ C. First suppose that p1 ≍ p2, then by Lemma 8
there is α ∈ [0, 1] such that πp1 + (1 − π)p2 ≍ ζα for every π ∈ R. Thus by Lemma
10 there are τ 1, τ 2 ≥ 0 such that (α, πτ 1 + (1− π)τ 2) ∈ Φ(πp1 + (1− π)p2) for every
π ∈ R, and hence for some ψ ∈ Ψ we have Uψ(p1) = Uψ(p2) = α. Now suppose that
for some (U,W ) ∈ V we have U(p1) = U(p2) and hence U(πp1 + (1 − π)p2) = α for
every π ∈ R. This implies that πp1 + (1 − π)p2 ≍ ζα for every π ∈ R and hence
p1 ≍ p2 by Lemma 8. 
Proof of Lemma 13 Fix p1, p2 ∈ C. First suppose that p1 ≻ p2, then by Lemma 12
there is no (U,W ) ∈ V such that U(p1) = U(p2). Suppose that for some (U,W ) ∈ V
we have U(p1) < U(p2), then letting τ 1 =W (p1) there is β ∈ (0, 1) such that
U(p2) =
βW (p1)U(p1) + (1− β)W (p)U(p)
βW (p1) + (1− β)W (p)
= U(βp1 + (1− β)p)
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Hence by Lemma 12, p2 ≍ βp1 + (1 − β)p, contradicting mixture dominance. Thus
we must have U(p1) > U(p2) for every (U,W ) ∈ V. Now suppose that U(p1) > U(p2)
for every (U,W ) ∈ V, this implies that ¬(p1 ≍ p2) by Lemma 12 and ¬(p1 ≺ p2) by
the argument above, and hence p1 ≻ p2. 
Proof of Lemma 14 Fix p ∈ C and for any ǫ ∈ R let pǫ = p+ǫ(δx−δx) for every ǫ ∈ R.
By Lemma 5 we have that (α, τ) ∈ Φ(p) if and only if (α + ǫ
τ
, τ) ∈ Φ(pǫ). Suppose







have that α∗ ≡ α1 + ǫ
∗
τ1
= α2 + ǫ
∗
τ2
. But this implies that (α∗, τ i) ∈ Φ(pǫ
∗
) for i = 1, 2
so that for every β ∈ (0, 1) we have
βpǫ
∗
+ (1− β)r ≍
βτ iζα∗ + (1− β)r
βτ i + (1− β)
≡ γiζα∗ + (1− γ
i)r ∀ r ∈ C
But τ 1 6= τ 2 implies γ1 6= γ2, contradicting Axiom 6. This implies that τ 1 = τ 2 for
every (α1, τ 1), (α2, τ 2) ∈ Φ(p). 
Proof of Lemma 15 Fix q1, q2 ∈ L(p). Suppose q1 ≻ q2, then by Lemma 7, U(q1) >
U(q2) for every (U,W ) ∈ V(p), so since (U,W ), (U,W ) ∈ V(p), U(q1) > U(q2) and
U(q1) > U(q2). Now suppose that U(q1) > U(q2) and U(q1) > U(q2). Then for
every (Uφ,W φ) ∈ V(p), there is by construction φ = (α′, τ ′) ∈ Φ(p) such that for
q = λp+ (1− λ)ζθ ∈ L(p),
Uφ(q) =
λτ ′α′ + (1− λ)θ
λτ ′ + (1− λ)
W φ(q) = λτ ′ + (1− λ)
By Lemma 13, we have that Φ(p) = [α(p), α(p)]× τ(p)], which implies that τ ′ = τ(p)
and for some π ∈ [0, 1] we have α′ = πα(p) + (1− π)α(p), which implies that
Uφ(q) =
λτ(p)[πα(p) + (1− π)α(p)] + (1− λ)θ
λτ(p) + (1− λ)
= πU(q) + (1− π)U(q)
This implies that Uφ(q1) > Uφ(q2) for every (Uφ,W φ) ∈ V(p) and hence by Lemma
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7, q1 ≻ q2. 





τ(p1)(1− τ(p2))α(p1)− τ(p2)(1− τ(p1))α(p2)
τ(p1)− τ(p2)
Then letting q2 = λ∗p2 + (1− λ∗)ζθ∗, we have that by Lemma 5,
α(q2) =
[1− τ(p1)]τ(p2)α(p2) + [τ(p1)(1− τ(p2))α(p1)− τ(p2)(1− τ(p1))α(p2)]









Fix π ∈ [0, 1] and let qπ = πp1+(1−π)q2, and assume without loss of generality that
τ(qπ) < τ(p1). Then for some δ ∈ R sufficiently large we have that






= α(p1 + δ(p− p)) = α(q2 + δ(p− p))
This implies that there is α′ ∈ [0, 1] such that p1+δ(p−p) ≺ ζα′ and q
2+δ(p−p) ≺ ζα′
but qπ + δ(p− p) = π[p1 + δ(p− p)] + (1− π)[q2 + δ(p− p)] ≻ ζα′ , violating mixture
dominance. A similar argument shows that we cannot have τ(qπ) > τ(p1), and thus



































(1− τ(p2))τ(p1) + (1− π)(τ(p2)− τ(p1))
π(1− τ(p2)) + (1− π)(1− τ(p1))
=
π(1− τ(p2))τ(p1) + (1− π)(1− τ(p1))τ(p2)
π(1− τ(p2)) + (1− π)(1− τ(p1))
= π′τ(p1) + (1− π′)τ(p2)
Furthermore, since by mixture dominance we have that α′ ≻ p1 and α′ ≻ q2 implies




















(1− τ(p2))τ(p1)α(p1) + (1− π)[τ(p2)(1− τ(p1))α(p2)− τ(p1)(1− τ(p2))α(p1)]
(1− τ(p2))τ(p1) + (1− π)(τ(p2)− τ(p1))
=
π(1− τ(p2))τ(p1)α(p1) + (1− π)(1− τ(p1))τ(p2)α(p2)
π(1− τ(p2))τ(p1) + (1− π)(1− τ(p1))τ(p2)
=
π′τ(p1)α(p1) + (1− π′)τ(p2)α(p2)
π′τ(p1) + (1− π′)τ(p2)




π′τ(p1)α(p1) + (1− π′)τ(p2)α(p2)
π′τ(p1) + (1− π′)τ(p2)

Proof of Theorem 3 We first establish the uniqueness of the weight function. By
mixture dominance there are x, x ∈ X such that δx = p and δx = p. For every x ∈ X
and ui ∈ Ũ i we have ui(x) > ui(x) > ui(x), so that there is α ∈ (0, 1) such that
ui(x) =
αwi(x)ui(x) + (1− α)wi(x)ui(x)
αwi(x) + (1− α)wi(x)
= U i(ζα)
By definition, this implies that δx ≍ ζα so that α ∈ A(δx). For every β ∈ (0, 1), we
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have by weighted linearity that
U i(βδx + (1− β)δx) =
βwi(x)ui(x) + (1− β)wi(x)ui(x)








βwi(x) + (1− β)wi(x)
On the other hand, by parallel substitution there is a unique τx such that for every





, which implies that
U i(βδx + (1− β)δx) =
[βτxα + (1− β)]w
i(x)ui(x) + βτx(1− α)w
i(x)ui(x)
[βτ(δx)α+ (1− β)]wi(x) + βτx(1− α)wi(x)
=
βτx[αw
i(x)ui(x) + (1− α)wi(x)ui(x)] + (1− β)wi(x)ui(x)
βτx[αwi(x) + (1− α)wi(x)] + (1− β)wi(x)
This implies for i = 1, 2 that wi(x) = τx[αw
i(x) + (1− α)wi(x)] for every α ∈ A(δx),
and hence wi(x) = wi(x). Therefore letting k = w
2(x)
w1(x)
we have that w2(x) = kw1(x)
for every x ∈ X .
We now establish the uniqueness of the convex cone generated by the set of utilities.




















are identical, denote it by ≻w.
Since p ≻ q if and only if pw ≻w qw, the transformed relation ≻w has a multi-utility
representation and hence satisfies independence. Define its domination cone by
Dw = {λ(pw − qw) : pw ≻w qw, λ ≥ 0}
Note that pw−qw ∈ Dw if and only if pw ≻ qw, since if pw−qw = λ(rw−sw) ∈ Dw for
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This implies pw ≻ qw by another application of independence. Hence for i = 1, 2,
ρ ∈ Dw if and only if
∑
x∈X ρ(x)u
i(x) > 0 for every u1 ∈ 〈Ũ i〉. Now suppose there is




ρ(x)u1(x) > 0 ≥
∑
x∈X
ρ(x)u∗(x) ∀ u1 ∈ 〈Ũ1〉
This implies that ρ ∈ Dw, so that there are pw, qw ∈ ∆(X) and λ ≥ 0 such that













w(x)u∗(x), a contradiction. Hence 〈Ũ2〉 \
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